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extensive and complete that it is frequently termed "plenary. '"1
Tribal governments likewise possess broad governmental powers
over both their members and their territory. 2 This federal and
tribal authority, in many instances, acts to deprive or otherwise
restrict state control over Indians and their property. 3 Domestic
relations is one area in which federal and tribal laws have
4
significantly affected state authority.
Indians have the right to make their own laws and to be
governed by them. 5 This right usually gives tribal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over divorces between members who reside upon the
reservation. 6 When both parties are Indians and live off the
1. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 377 (9th Cir. 1965). The United States Constitution
specifically gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce with . . . Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, S 8, cl.
3. Known as the "commerce clause," the Supreme Court has construed this
constitutional provision as granting Congress the total and exclusive power over Indians and their
affairs. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). Congress enjoys an
additional source of control over many Indian reservations because the federal government holds
tide, in trust for the respective tribes or individual Indians, to a significant portion of many
reservations. Cf. id. at 175 ("all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States
or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been
extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States"). This land is property of the United
States and, therefore, comes under federal control because Congress has the power "to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, 5 3.
2. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
3. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (State of
Arizona could not impose tax on income of a Navajo Indian who resided upon and derived her
income solely from reservation sources); Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 667-68
(9th Cir. 1975) (county lacked authority to enforce its zoning ordinance or building code on Indian
reservation trusts land), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); see also
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223
(1959) (a state cannot exercise its jurisdiction over reservation residents or affairs when to do so
would undermine the tribe's right to make, and be governed, by its own laws). But Cf Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980) (upholding State of Washington's authority to tax
on-reservation tobacco sales to non-Indians and nonmember Indians).
4. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. S 181 (1982) (white men marrying Indian women acquire no interest in
their wives' tribal property). Section 181, title 25 of the United States Code does not apply to Indian
men marrying "white" women, nor to Indian men or women marrying persons other than
Caucasians; but this probably does not render the law constitutionally defective. The United States
Constitution grants Congress great latitude in treating Indians differently from other peoples. See
Fisher v.District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976).
5. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220(1959).
6. See Stewart v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290, 292 (Mont. 1980). Although tribal courts usually
have exclusive jurisdiction over divorces between tribal members, Congress has permitted some
states to acquire jurisdiction over divorces and other matters involving Indians domiciled on a
reservation. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, SS6-7, 67 Star. 588, 588 (conferring
jurisdiction for particular crimes and claims).
Public Law 83-280 provided two means by which states could acquire jurisdiction over
reservation Indians. First, to Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington,
Congress granted civil and criminal jurisdiction over some or all of the reservations located in these
particular states. Set 18 U.S.C. S 1162 (1982) (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. 5 1360 (civil
jurisdiction). Jurisdiction was conveyed by Public Law 83-280 to these states because their respective
tribal and state officials were in agreement over a transfer of authority. See S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF
INDIAN POLICY 183 (1973).

Second, Public Law 83-280 authorized the rest of the states to amend their enabling acts and
constitutions, and to assume such additional civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian
lands as the various state legislatures felt appropriate. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280,
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reservation, however, state courts may have concurrent jurisdiction
with the tribal court. 7 If a state court has concurrent jurisdiction,
then it has the authority to grant a divorce, 8 or award custody of
minor children, 9 but the state court generally cannot dispose of the
marital estate located on the reservation.' 0 Nor can the state court
enforce or modify its orders respecting an Indian party once that
person returns to the reservation." Marriages between Indians
and non-Indians present similar limitations on state authority.12
Regardless of whether the husband or wife is Indian, state
courts clearly have the right to grant a divorce, 13 decide child
custody matters,14 and enter support orders when the parties reside
off the reservation.' 5 If either the husband or wife is non-Indian,
state courts probably have jurisdiction to grant a divorce even when
the parties have a reservation domicile. 16 Yet notwithstanding the
initial existence of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in these
SS 6-7, 67 Stat. 588, 590. Many states took advantage of this congressional offer and acquired
IDnAo.CODE S 67-5 101 (Supp.
(1986) (assumption ofjurisdiction in domestic relations cases); WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1964)
(acquisition of domestic relations jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 83-280).

jurisdiction over on-reservation activities, including divorce. See, e.g.,

Regardless of whether a state is the beneficiary of a direct grant of authority from Congress, or
assumed control, the jurisdiction conveyed by Public Law 83-280 is concurrent with that of the
tribes. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON FEDERAL AND TRIBAL
JURISDICTION 23 (1976) ("with all its imperfections, the limited concurrent jurisdiction under Public
Law 83-280, which we have lived with for the past 15 years or so, has come close to working"). But
in child custody matters, Congress has provided a mechanism for tribes otherwise subject to state
jurisdiction to reassume their exclusive authority in this area. See 25 U.S.C. § .1918 (1982). To
reacquire its exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, a tribe must petition the Bureau
of Indian Affairs ("BIA") for a return of exclusive jurisdiction and receive the Secretary of Interior's
approval. See 25 C.F.R. §S 13.1-13.16 (1986). This petitioning procedure permits a tribe to reclaim
unquestioned exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings without protracted litigation with
the state. See id. S 13.1(b).
7. Cf. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 449 (1975) (disestablishment of Lake
Traverse Reservation vested South Dakota with the authority to terminate parental rights of an
Indian mother residing within boundaries of former reservation).
8. See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 142-43 (N.D. 1980).
9. See id.
10. Cf id. at 142-43.
11. Seeid. at 143.
12. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. It is quite natural for one to think of Indians as
a racial classification, but this would be incorrect. The Supreme Court has determined that being
"Indian" is a political rather than racial classification. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553
n.24 (1974) (upholding a Bureau of Indian Affairs employment preference for Indians by stating that
"[t]he preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies
only to members of'federally recognized' tribes"). Tribes may become federally recognized through
treaty, statute, or executive order, but so long as a tribe remains unrecognized, its members are
legally indistinguishable from other non-Indian citizens. See Trentadue, Tribal Court JurisdictionOver
CollectionSuits by Local Merchants and Lenders:An Obstacle to Credit for ReservationIndians?, 13 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. __ ,_
n. 17 (1986).
13. See Malatrre, 293 N.W.2d at 139.
14. See id.
15. See id.; cf. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500,
660 P.2d 590,
592 (when Indian putative father was properly served with process off reservation, state court had
jurisdiction over paternity action involving non-Indian mother), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 803 (1983).
16. See Lonewolf v. Lonewolf, 99 N.M. 300, __
657 P.2d 627, 628-29 (1982) (in marriage
between Indian and non-Indian domiciled on reservation, state court had jurisdiction in divorce
proceeding).
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cross cultural marriage cases, state courts normally lack the power
to enforce their orders if an Indian spouse returns to the
reservation. 1 7 State courts are also restricted in their ability to
dispose of the marital estate in Indian and non-Indian divorces. 1 8
But perhaps the most important infringement upon state authority
in the area of domestic relations law is that which was brought
about by passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.19
The Indian Child Welfare Act ("Act" or "ICWA") governs
adoption, termination of parental rights, foster care, and
preadoptive placements when the child is an Indian. 20 The ICWA
refers to these actions as Indian child custody proceedings. 2 1 Indian
child custody matters that do not come under the Act include
parental custody disputes, 22 and placements necessitated by
criminal acts of the child. 23 To avoid confusion, use of the phrase
"custody proceedings" in this Article will refer only to those
matters within the purview of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
In passing the ICWA, Congress established a national
standard of practice for preadoptive and foster care placements,
termination of parental rights, and adoptions involving Indian
children. This Act sets certain procedures 24 that must be complied
17. See Malaterre,293 N.W.2d at 139.
18. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 5 181 (1982) (prohibiting a white man from acquiring any interest in his
Indian wife's tribal property). Respecting a state court's property determinations in general, federal
law provides that:
In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party on one side,
and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the white person,
whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of
previous possession or ownership.
Id. 5 194 (emphasis added). This statute has been applied in a divorce action. See Sheppard v.
,655 P.2d 895, 905 (1982).
Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, .
19. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified
mainly in 25 U.S.C. 5S 1901-1963 (1982)).
20. See 25 U.S.C. SS 1902-1903(1) (1982). A "preadoptive placement" is the temporary
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or other institution after the termination of parental

rights, but prior to or in substitute of placement of that child in an adoptive home. Id. 5 1903(1) (iii).
The ICWA does not apply to voluntary foster care placements that allow the child's parents or
custc~ian to demand his or her return at anytime. See id. S 1903(1)(i); see also D.E.D. v. State of
Alaska, 704 P.2d 774, 781 (Alaska 1985) (voluntary foster care placements that do not operate to
prohibit the parents from regaining custody of their child are not covered by the Act). Furthermore,
by implication, the ICWA likewise does not cover nonremoval interventions in, or investigations of,
Indian families by state agencies. See 25 U.S.C. SS 1902-1903(1) (1982). For discussion of who.
qualifies as an Indian for purposes of the ICWA, see infra notes 105-08.
21. 25 U.S.C. S 1903(1) (1982).
-, 617 P.2d 121, 125-26 (1980) (ICWA
22. See id.; see, e.g., In re Bertelson, 189 Mont. 524,
does not apply to child custody dispute between non-Indian mother and Indian paternal
grandparents). But see A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982) (applying ICWA to
custody dispute among members of extended family), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
23. SeeA.B.M., 651 P.2d at 1173 (ICWA does not apply tojuvenile delinquency actions).

24. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 5 1913(a) (1982) (setting out strict procedures for obtaining a parent or
custodian's consent to foster care placement of, or termination of, their parental rights to an Indian

child). For a more detailed discussion of the ICWA's procedural requirements, see infra text
accompanying notes 129-314.
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with in Indian child custody proceedings. It further mandates that
the courts accord the child, parents or Indian custodian, and the
25
tribe certain statutory due process rights.
The Act takes a nonadversarial approach to its observance.
Any party petitioning for removal of an Indian child from his or her
home, and the state courts, are required to implement the Indian
Child Welfare Act's procedures. 26 Failure to comply with
the strict requirements of the ICWA not only may void custody
proceedings involving Indian children, 2" but the attorney or social
worker who violates this law also runs considerable risk of incurring
civil liability to his or her client, the tribe, or others. 28
North Dakota has a considerable Indian population. 29 Indian
25. See, e.g., id. S 1911(c) (granting to an Indian child's tribe the right to intervene in an
involuntary state court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of, parental rights
to that child). For an extensive discussion of the rights that the Act confers upon parents, Indian
custodians, tribes and Indian children, see infa text accompanying notes 157-314.
The Act defines "Indian custodian" as any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian
child under tribal law or custom, or under state law, or to whom the temporary physical care,
custody, and control of an Indian child has been transferred by the child's parent. See id. 5 1903(6)
(1982). However, mere presence of the child with an Indian family member does not make that
family member an "Indian custodian" without proof that the parent either transferred, attempted to
transfer, or intended to transfer. the physical care, custody, and control of the child to that person. See
In re Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741,
-, 331 N.W.2d 785, 789 (1983). Although non-Indians might not
qualify as an Indian custodian under the ICWA, the non-Indian parent of an Indian child is fully
entitled to the Act's protections. See In re G.L.O.C. & T.J.M., 668 P.2d 235, 238 (Mont. 1983).
26. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982) (requiring the state court, and the party seeking foster
care placement of or termination of parental rights to an Indian child to give notice to the child's
parents, Indian custodian, and tribe); id. S 1913(a) (mandating a judge's active participation any
time a parent or Indian custodian consents to foster care placement or termination of parental
rights). When applicable, the provisions of the ICWA must be observed; compliance is mandatory.
In re K.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d 840,842 (S.D. 1982). Consequently, regardless of whether a particular
provision of the Act directs the state court or petitioning party to give notice or initiate some other
procedure, the authors of this Article strongly suggest that every person and governmental entity
involved in an Indian child custody proceeding make whatever efforts are necessary in order to
comply with this law. "Every person and governmental entity" includes judges, attorneys and the
parties. The ramifications of noncompliance are so serious that everyone involved should ensure that
the ICWA is observed. For a discussion of the ramifications of noncompliance, see infra notes 291314 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 130 Ariz. 202,
635 P.2d 187,
191 (Ct. App. 1981) (setting aside order terminating parental rights and returning child to natural
mother because of trial court's failure to comply with the ICWA), cert. deied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982);
In re Morgan, 140 Mich. App. 594, -,
364 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1985) (reversing termination of
parental rights because trial court did not apply correct standards under ICWA). A state court's
compliance with the ICWA provisions is mandatory. In re K.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d 840, 842 (S.D.
1982). For a discussion of enforcing the ICWA, see infra notes 291-314.
28. In addition to ever present threats of liability for attorney malpractice, a much broader
source of liability may exist against attorneys and caseworkers under the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See
42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1982) (providing for civil liability when a person's federal rights have been
infringed under color of state law). Unless otherwise immune from suit, anyone who, while acting
under color of state law, violates another's rights created by the ICWA would presumably be subject
to S 1983 liability. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981) (unless the remedial devices provided in a federal statute are sufficiently
comprehensive to show a congressional intent to foreclose recourse to 5 1983, a remedy may be had
under 5 1983 for the violation of federal statutory rights).
29. Indians comprise 3.1% of the total North Dakota population. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE.
CENSUS, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: 1980
CENSUS OF POPULATION 24 (1984). Nationally, persons of Indian, Eskimo or Aleut ancestry constitute'
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children are the frequent subjects of foster care or adoptive
placement actions in North Dakota state courts.3 0 Yet despite the
applicability of the ICWA and the potential for civil liability for
ignoring its provisions, this law goes largely uncomplied with by
social agencies, attorneys, and judges.3 1 This Article will attempt to
remedy that situation, for it is intended to apprise judges and
practitioners of the requirements of that law;3 2 especially the
less than one-half of one percent (.0062%) of the total United States resident population. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE.CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE.UNITED STATES 31 (105th ed. 1985). Within
the borders of North Dakota lie all or part of five separate Indian reservations. Table 1 gives the
Indian population figures associated with each of these reservations.
TABLE 1
NORTH DAKOTA RESERVATION POPULATIONS*

RESERVATION
Fort Berthold
Fort Totten
Sisseton-Wahpeton
Standing Rock
Turtle Mountain

INDIANS LIVING
ON RESERVATIONS

TOTAL INDIAN POPULATION
INCLUDING THOSE LIVING
OFF RESERVATION"

2640
2261
24
2341
4021

3081
3109
299
4017
9583

North Dakota reservation population figures were extracted from data compiled
BUREAU OF THE.CENSUS, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: 1980 CENSUS OF
POPULATION 24 (1984) (containing population statistics for identified reservations).
These figures, however, only include Indians actually residing upon a North Dakota
reservation. Omitted from this table are those Indians who happen to live upon
portion of the Sisseton-Wahpeton or Standing Rock Reservations located in South
Dakota.
* *These totals represent Indians living either on the reservation or in nearby offreservation communities. These figures were obtained from data collected by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. See U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN SERVICE

during the 1980 national census. See U.S.

POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES (1983).

30. For recent data concerning the volume of Indian child custody proceedings in North Dakota
state courts, see infraTables 2 and 3, and notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
31. In 1984, Congress held a hearing on the ICWA to determine the effect of this law on the
removal of Indian children from their families and to see what, if anything, could be done to improve
the law. See Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (hereinafter 1984 Indian Child Welfare Hearing]. The evidence
adduced at this hearing disclosed that in many states voluntary state compliance with the ICWA was
the exception rather than the rule. See id. at 183 (statement of Tobias Robles, representative of the
Native American Centers Child Welfare Program, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma); see also id. at 158-62
(statement of Eric Eberhard, Deputy Attorney General, Navajo Indian Nation, outlining state court
efforts not to comply with the ICWA). Sometimes attorneys and social workers intentionally disobey
the provisions of the ICWA. See, e.g., In reJ.K.S., 356 N.W.2d 88, 91 n.2 (N.D. 1984) (a case in
which the state admitted taking action to avoid application of the ICWA). But a more common
reason for judges, attorneys, and social workers' disregard of the ICWA is undoubtedly ignorance;
they are simply unaware of this law. The conclusion that many attorneys and judges are unaware of
the ICWA is supported by the fact that, with one exception, the major family law casebooks do not
mention the Act. SeeJ. AREEN, FAMILY LAW (1985); I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, FAMILY
LAW (1986); C. FooTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, FAMILY LAW (1985); H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW (1983).
But see H. CLARK, JR., DOMESTIC RELATIONS 531 n.8 (1980) (covering the ICWA in a single
casenote).
32. Numerous articles and notes have been written on the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 but
few, if any, approach the subject from a practitioner's perspective. See, e.g., Barsh, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A CriticalAnalysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1980); Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare

1986]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

regulations and guidelines promulgated by the Department of the
Interior.
The ICWA authorizes the Secretary of Interior ("Secretary")
to promulgate "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions" of the Act. 33 The Secretary, acting
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"), has promulgated
numerous mandatory rules and regulations. 34 The Secretary of
Interior also published recommended procedures or guidelines
("guidelines") for state courts involved in Indian child custody
proceedings. 35 Although these guidelines are not binding, 36 they do
represent what the BIA believes is required to assure that the rights
guaranteed in the ICWA are protected when state courts decide
37
Indian child custody matters.
Despite their nonbinding nature, state courts
do consult the
guidelines on matters of procedure under the ICWA. 38 Thus, all
Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian
Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51 (1979); Note, Conflict of Laws: The Plurality of Legal Systems: An
Analysis of 25 U.S.C. 551901-63, The Indian Child WelfareAct, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 333 (1980); Note,
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Provisions and Policy, 25 S.D. L. REV. 98 (1980); In Re D.L.L. &
C.L.L., Minors: Ruling on the Constitutionalityof the Indian Child Welfare Act, 26 S.D. L. REV. 67 (1981).
33. See 25 U.S.C. S 1952 (1982).
34. The regulations were not published until July 31, 1979. See 44 Fed. Reg. 45,092 (1979). The
regulations are not comprehensive. Instead, the Secretary's regulations cover only narrow areas of
the ICWA. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. SS 13.1-13.16 (1986) (establishing procedures by which tribes may
reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings); id. SS 23.1-23.93 (1986) (ICWA regulations
governing notice, appointment of counsel, funding, and the Secretary's assistance in identifying
witnesses and locating biological parents and Indian interpreters).
35. See Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584-95
(Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter Guideline].
36. See Guideline, supra note 35, at 67,584. Of course, when convinced that the Secretary's
guidelines are not necessary to comply with the ICWA, state courts are free to ignore them. See id.;
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 70 Or. App. 10, -,
688 P.2d 1354, 1360 n.5 (1984)
(refusing to adopt guidelines on expert witnesses), review dismissed, 299 Or. 341, 701 P.2d 1052
(1985).
37. Guideline, supra note 35, at 67,584. State courts are free to establish rules that provide even
greater protection for the rights guaranteed by the Act. Id. Congress has authorized states and Indian
tribes to enter into agreements respecting the care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings. 25 US.C. S 1919 (1982). Some states have taken advantage of this
congressional consent to address the problem of state and tribal jurisdiction over Indian child
custody matters. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, SS 40-40.9 (West Supp. 1985-86) (Oklahoma
Indian Child Welfare Act). North Dakota has apparently not negotiated a child custody agreement
with any tribe, nor has it otherwise addressed the subject with legislation. See 1984 Indian Child
Welfare Hearing, supra note 31, at 31.
38. See, e.g., In reJ.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 322 (Iowa 1984) (setting aside foster care placement
of Indian child because the state trial court had based its decision on socio-economic considerations
which the guidelines stated were improper); see also D.E.D. v. State of Alaska, 704 P.2d 774, 779 n.8
(Alaska 1985) (while not binding on state courts, the guidelines are instructive); In re Appeal in
Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 136 Ariz. 528, __,
667 P.2d 228, 232 n.4 (Ct.
App. 1983) (the guidelines are a useful source of information f6r questions that frequently arise over
implementation of the Act); In rejunious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786, 793, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 n.7
(1983) (guidelines are entitled to great weight); In reJ.L.H., 299 N.W.2d 812, 815 (S.D. 1980)
(guidelines represent the Department of Interior's interpretation of the ICWA).
When Congress expressly delegates to the Secretary of the Interior the primary responsibility for

interpreting a statute, regulations have legislative effect. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
425 (1977) (when Congress entrusts Secretary with obligation to issue regulations, regulations have
legislative effect). Courts are not free to set aside those regulations simply because they would have
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applicable provisions of the guidelines are included in this Article's
*discussion of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. The guidelines
are also included because judicial interpretation of the ICWA is
virtually nonexistent. 39 In fact, so little caselaw exists that in many
instances the guidelines provide the only interpretation of what is
required for compliance with the Act.4 0
II. BACKGROUND
Congress intended the ICWA to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability of Indian tribes and
families.4 1 Congress undoubtedly felt this law was necessary
because of the number of Indian children being removed from their
families and placed in non-Indian foster care or adoptive homes;4 2 a
process that was often facilitated by the manner in which the state
legal system handled Indian child custody cases.4 3 In order to fully
comprehend how the ICWA functions, it is therefore necessary to
have some understanding of the serious problems that this Act was
designed to solve, and the state laws that it changed.
A.

REMOVAL OF INDIAN CHILDREN:

A

NATIONAL CRISIS

The future of the Indian in American society is solely
dependent upon the survival of tribalism. 44 Without tribes, which
interpreted the law in another manner. See, e.g., id. However, whetl the primary responsibility for
construing a statute rests with the courts, as in the case of the suggested guidelines, administrative
interpretation of the statute is given important, but not controlling, significance. See, e.g., id. at 424-

25.
39. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A. $ 1914 (Supp. 1986) (although the Act has nationwide application and
5 1914 is the main enforcement provision of that law, few cases appear in the United States Code
Annotated under this particular statute). Each section of the guidelines is accompanied by
commentary explaining why state courts should adopt them, and providing guidance in interpreting

that provision. See Guideline, supranote 35, at 67,584. When relevant to the discussion of a particular
guideline, the commentary is included in this Article.
40. One might argue that the lack of caselaw reflects a tendency on the part ofjudges, attorneys,
and social workers to comply with the ICWA. The latest data, however, suggest this is not so. See
1984 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 31, at 159-62 (statement of Eric Eberhard, Deputy
Attorney General, Navajo Indian Nation). In 1980, despite passage of the ICWA and the protections
that it gives Indian parents, states were continuing to remove Indian children'from their homes at a
rate five times that of non-Indians. Id. at 14-15 (statement of Casimer Wichlacz, Deputy
Commissioner, Administration for Native Americans, Department of Health and Human Services).
Since Congress enacted the ICWA to combat the problem of state courts removing Indian children
from their homes, this post-Act high removal rate for Indian children suggests that the law is not
being observed.
41. See 25 U.S.C. S1902 (1982); Guideline A. 1, supra note 35, at 67,585-86.
42. See 25 U.S.C. S 1901(4) (1982).
43. Seeid. 5 1901(5).
44. Membership in a tribe is the sine qua non of being Indian. See generally United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). Persons of Indian ancestry who are not members of a federally
recognized tribe or group often have the same legal status as non-Indians in general. See Washington
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are the focal point for Indian culture and religion, there will be no
Indians. 45 Numerous tribes exist in the United States. 46 Each tribe
is a separate political and cultural entity,4 7 but they all have a
common need for their survival: children; children who are
48
enrolled in that tribe, and reared in that unique Indian culture.
When Indian children are removed from their tribe and reared as
non-Indians, they often cease to be "Indian. 49
Removal of Indian children from their respective tribes is not a
new phenomenon.5 0 Nor has removal necessarily been motivated
out of a desire to harm either the Indian child or the tribe. 5 1 But
v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980) (nonmember Indians were treated the
same as non-Indians for purposes of state taxation).
45. Indian children who are reared in non-Indian homes lose their Indian identity. See generally
Comment, Custody Provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The Effect on California Dependency
Law, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 647, 651-54(1979).
46. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE.CENSUS, 2 SUBJECT REPORTS, AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMOS, AND
ALEUTS ON IDENTIFIED

RESERVATIONS

AND IN THE. HISTORIC

AREAS OF OKLAHOMA (EXCLUDING

URBANIZED AREAS): 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION 16-31 (1985). Congress has even provided a means
by which identifiable but previously unrecognized Indian groups may become a federally recognized
tribe and acquire a reservation. See 25 U.S.C. 6 467 (1982) (authorizing Secretary of the Interior to
proclaim new Indian reservations); 25 C.F.R. SS 83.1-83.11 (1986) (procedures for becoming a
federally recognized tribe).
47. Each of the North Dakota reservations, for instance, has its own separate government,
including a tribal court system. See, e.g., DEVILS LAKE SIOUX CONST. art. IV (1960); TURTLE
MOUNTAIN BAND OF CH12PEWA CONST. art. IV (1959).
48. See 25 U.S.C. S 1901(3) (1982).
49. See generally Comment, supra note 45, at 651-54.
50. In June 1744, commissioners from Maryland and Virginia negotiated a treaty with the
Indians of the Six Nations (Mohawks, Onondagas, Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas, and Tuscaroras).
Guerrero, supra note 32, at 51. This treaty was concluded at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, at which time
the tribes were invited to send their young men to William and Mary College, an offer that was not
too good to refuse:
We know that you highly esteem the kind of learning taught in those Colleges, and the
Maintenance of our young Men, while with you, would be very expensive to you. We
are convinced, that you mean to do us Good by your Proposal; and we thank you
heartily. But you, who are wise must know that different Nations have different
Conceptions of things and you will therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas of this kind
of Education happen not to be the same as yours. We have had some Experience of it.
Several of our Young People were formerly brought up at the Colleges of the Northern
Provinces; they were instructed in all your Sciences; but, when they came back to us,
they were bad Runners, ignorant of every means of living in the woods ... neither fit
for Hunters, Warriors, nor Counsellors, they were totally good for nothing. We are,
however, not the less oblig'd by your kind Offer, tho' we decline accepting it; and, to
show our grateful Sense of it, if the Gentlemen of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their
Sons, we will take Care of their Education, instruct them in all we know, and make
Men of them.
DRAKE, I BIOGRAPHY.AND HISTORY OF THE.INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 27 (3d ed. 1834), quoted in

Guerrero, supra note 32, at 51.
51. The federal government has, until recently, followed a policy of assimilating the Indian
people. See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. SS 331-34, 336, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1982)) (this law was designed to break up
reservations and to assimilate Indians into mainstream American culture); Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 5 1162 (1982)); 28 U.S.C. S
1360 (1982)) (an enunciated policy of assimilation by providing the means for states to assume
control of reservation government). The practice of removing Indian children and rearing them in a
non-Indian culture was complementary to this national

assimilating Indian people.

policy of destroying tribalism and
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regardless of the policy or the intentions behind the practice, by the
mid-1970s removal of Indian children and their placement in non52
Indian homes had reached a crisis level.
In 1969 and again in 1974, the Association on American
Indian Affairs ("AAIA' ,)53 conducted surveys of the foster care and
adoptive placement of Indian children. 54 These AAIA surveys were
conducted in states that have significant Indian populations.5 5 The
survey results indicated that approximately twenty-five to thirtyfive percent of all American Indian children were being separated
from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or
institutions. 56 From 1971 to 1972, nearly one in every four
57
American Indian children under the age of one was adopted.
Data from the Fort Totten Reservation in North Dakota discloses
that, in 1968, twenty-five percent of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian
children were either in foster care, adoptive homes, or
5 8
institutions.
The magnitude of this problem is aptly illustrated by the
following tables, adapted from pre-Act data collected by the AAIA
at the request of the American Indian Policy Review
Commission. 59 Table 2 compares the number of foster placements
per 1000 Indians and non-Indians in North Dakota and its
neighboring states. 60 Table 3 presents an estimate of the number of'
adoptions per 1000 Indian children as compared with non-Indian
61
children in this same four state region.
TABLE 2
State
Minnesota
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota

Foster Care Placements
Year
(Placements per 1,000 children)
Indian
Non-Indian
1972
58.1
3.5
1976
35.3
2.8
1976
36.1
1.8
1974
45.5
2.0

52. See Indian Child Welfare Program:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1974) (statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Association on American Indian
Affairs) [hereinafter 1974 Indian Child Welfare Hearing].
53. The AAIA is a national nonprofit organization, founded to assist American Indian and
Alaska Native communities with their efforts towards achieving full economic and social equality. See
id. at 15.
54. See id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 95.
59. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 538 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing].
60. See id. at 540.
61. See id. at 539, 570,572,581,592.
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TABLE 3
Adoptions of Indian Children
Year
(Adoptions per 1,000 children)
Indians
Non-Indians
1964-1975
126.6
32.2
1973-1975
35.8
6.9
1975
32.6
11.6
1970-1975
55.5
30.9

A quick scan of the foregoing tables reveals that, prior to
passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act, Indian children in this
four state area were removed from their homes with unusual
frequency. During this time period Indian children were placed in
foster care, adoptive homes, and institutions in a far greater
proportion than non-Indian children. 62 Some of these Indianchildren were undoubtedly abused or neglected and, as a
consequence, they should have been removed from their parents or
legal custodians. But it would be grossly inaccurate to justify the
disproportionate numbers of Indian children in foster care or
adoptive homes solely on the basis of a higher than usual incidence
of neglect among Indian parents and custodians.
Critics of the practice of removing Indian children argue
that the disproportionate number of Indian children being taken
from their homes reflects a cultural bias against Indians. 63 Indian
organizations criticize non-Indian caseworkers for their insensitivity to, or ignorance of, traditional Indian values. 64 Because
they are not familiar with Indian customs and communities, state
62. By per capita rate, Indian children were being removed from their homes and placed with an
adoptive or foster care family 520% more often than non-Indian children in Minnesota. Id. at 571.
Montana's removal rate for Indian children was 730% greater than non-Indian children. Id. at 573.
North Dakota's removal rate for Indian children was 520% greater than that of non-Indians. Id. at
582. State removal of South Dakota Indian children was 270% greater than non-Indian placements.
Id. at 593. Ironically, several years after passage of the ICWA, states were continuing to remove'
Indian children from their homes at a rate 5 times that of non-Indians. See 1984 Indian
Child Welfare Hearing,supra note 31, at 14-15 (statement of Casimer Wichlacz). North Dakota's 1980
per capita placement of Indian children was at a rate almost 13 times greater than the rate for nonIndian children. See id. at 21. Moreover, North Dakota was not alone in the continued
disproportionate removal of Indian children from their homes. In 1980, for example, Minnesota's
per capita removal rate for Indian children was 12 times greater than that for non-Indian children;
Montana's removal rate for Indian children was 6 times higher than the rate for non-Indian children;
and in South Dakota, state courts were removing Indian children at a rate almost 27 times that of
non-Indians. Id. This continued high removal rate of Indian children is further evidence that state
courts are apparently not observing the ICWA.
63. See 1974 Indian Child Welfare Hearing supra note 52, at 17-21 (prepared statement of William
Byler); id. at 95 (excerpt from the IndianAffairs, AAIA newsletter, June-Aug. 1968).
64. See 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 59, at 281; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMMISSION, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 180 (1976) (hereinafter 1976
POLICY REvIEW REPORT).
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social workers are often accused of misinterpreting family and child
behavior. 65 In addition, many state agencies and caseworkers
refuse to recognize the concept of "extended family," a common
66
Indian child rearing practice.
An Indian's extended family includes not only grandparents,
and aunts and uncles, but often distant relatives who, by custom,
tradition, or necessity have definite responsibilities and duties in
child rearing. 67 Although the nuclear family is the generally
accepted standard of a basic family unit, the nuclear family concept
is frequently inapplicable to Indians. 6 Yet it is the nuclear family
standard by which many state courts determine that Indian
children are neglected. 69 This built-in bias against Indian child
rearing practices is further compounded by state laws, laws that
frequently make it easy to remove Indian children.

B.

STATE JURISDICTION PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF THE

ICWA

Many Indian children were removed from their families
during the mid-1970s and subsequently placed in foster care or
adoptive homes with their parents' consent. In most cases,
however, the child's removal was involuntary, a court ordered
nonconsensual placement. State courts were the primary architects
of this removal crisis, and they were aided in their task by three
aspects of state law. First, the "best interest of the child" standard,
so widely used in custody determinations, unfairly disadvantaged
Indian parents.7 0 This standard, with its heavy reliance upon
subjective judicial conclusions concerning a child's welfare,
65. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7532; 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 59, at 140 (statement of Dr.
Marlene Echohawk); id. at 155-56 (statement of National Tribal Chairmen's Association).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 20. The ICWA provides that an "extended
family member" is to be defined by tribal law and custom or, in the absence of such law or custom,
the terms shall include "a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first
or second cousin, or stepparent ....
25 U.S.C. S 1903(2) (1982). An extended family member can
even be non-Indian. See id. While extended family members may not have custodial rights under
state law, they do have such rights under tribal law and Congress intended to protect these rights
when it enacted the ICWA. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 20.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 20.
68. Some state social workers have concluded that leaving an Indian child with persons outside
the nuclear family is evidence of neglect and, therefore, grounds for removing that child. See 1977
Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 59, at 316-17 (statement of National Indian Health Board);
H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 10. See generally Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (extending constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family to multigenerational
extended family).
69. See 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing,supra note 59, at 316-17.
70. See 1976 POLIcy REviEw REPORT, supra note 64, at 79; 1974 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra
note 52, at 57-58 (statement of Doctors Mindell and Gurwitt).
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unavoidably involved "cultural and familial values which are often.
opposed to values held by the Indian family.' '71
Many times in deciding the best interest of Indian children,
state courts would defer to the opinions of social workers, who often
had a built-in cultural bias. 72 Economic considerations also came
into play, and both caseworkers and judges usually agreed that an
Indian child's best interest was better served by his or her
placement with a more affluent non-Indian foster or adoptive
home. 7 3 The net effect of the "best interest of the child" standard
was to automatically shift the burden of proof on the issue of
parental competency to the Indian parents, and these parents
4
generally failed to meet their burden. 7
A second aspect of state law that facilitated removal of Indian
children was the willingness of state courts to assume jurisdiction in
these cases. If the child was from a mixed marriage, state courts
showed little hesitancy in proceeding to hear the custody matter.
The presence of one non-Indian parent was considered sufficient to
vest state courts with subject matter jurisdiction regardless of the
75
fact that the child might be domiciled on an Indian reservation.
When both parents were Indian, state courts still exercised
jurisdiction if the child was either domiciled or present offthe
reservation. 76 The only situation in which state courts regularly
refused to hear custody proceedings involving an Indian child were
those cases in which both parents were Indian, the child was
domiciled on a reservation, and the matter was before a tribal
court.

77

The final aspect of state child custody law that contributed
greatly to the pre-Act removal of Indian children was the failure to
recognize tribal interests. With few exceptions, state custody
proceedings gave little heed to the child's ethnic identity, or the
71. 1976 POLIcY REVIEW REPORT, supra note 64, at 80. North Dakota employs a best interest of

the child standard. See In re D.G., 246 N.W.2d 892, 895 (N.D. 1976).
72. See 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing,supra note 59, at 1 ("public and private welfare agencies
seem to have operated on the premise that most Indian children would really be better off growing up
non-Indian").
73. See id. at 77-78 (statement of Goldie Denny, Director of Social Services, Quinault Nation);
id. at 187 (statement of Rena Uviller, Director, Juvenile Rights Pioject, American Civil Liberties
Union).
74. See 1974 Indian Child Wefare Hearing supra note 52, at 60-61 (statement of Doctors Mindell
and Gurwitt).
75. See, e.g., In re Duryea, 115 Ariz. 86, __,
563 P.2d 885, 887 (1977) (court had jurisdiction
when Indian children were purposively and voluntarily removed from the reservation).

76. See In re Greybull, 23 Or. App. 674, 677, 543 P.2d 1079, 1080 (1979); In re Duryea, 115
Ariz. 86, -,
563 P.2d 885, 887 (1977) (Indian children and parents were domiciled on an Indian
reservation, but parents' voluntary placement ofchildren in off-reservation foster care provided state
court jurisdiction to terminate parental rights).
77. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 383 (1976) (holding that when all the parties
are members and residents of the tribe, state court had no jurisdiction).
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tribe's interest in that child. 78 State courts routinely placed Indian
children with non-Indian families, and frequently the children
became disassociated from their tribes.7 9 This process was further
aggravated by the state's tendency not to give tribal court
judgments full faith and credit.8 0
A tribal court's determination of what was in a particular
child's best intereit could be easily circumvented if someone
removed the child from the reservation. Once off the reservation,
the child would come under state jurisdiction and a state court
could decide the matter of custody anew. 8 ' Thus, a tribal court's
findings and orders in a custody case were only enforceable while
the child remained on the reservation. All of this changed,
however, with the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978.82

Congress passed the ICWA to combat the problem of state
83
courts removing Indian children form their families and tribes.
To accomplish its announced goals of protecting Indian children
and promoting tribal stability,8 4 the Act established minimum
federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families. 5 The Act also established standards to facilitate the
78. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, -, 555 P.2d 906, 914-15 (Ct. App. 1976)
(in placing an Indian child with a non-Indian family, the court minimized the importance of ethnic
heritage and customs). But cf. Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Alaska 1972) (reversing the trial
judge's decision in a parental custody dispute for not recognizing the value of the child's tribal
culture).
79. See 1976 POLICy REVIEw REPORT, supra note 64, at 179 (most of the Indian children
separated from their natural parents are placed in some form of care supervised by a non-Indian); see
also 1974 Indian Child Wefare Hearing,supra note 52, at 17 (statement of William Byler).
80. See 1976 PoLicy REvIEw REPORT, supra note 64, at 86. The reason most often given by state
courts for their refusal to give full faith and credit to judgments from Indian courts is that the full
faith and credit clause does not apply to tribal governments. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 1; see also
Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133, 136 (D.S.D. 1971); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc.,
117 Ariz. 192, 197, 571 P.2d 689, 694 (Ct. App. 1977). But see In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d
649, -, 555 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1976) (holding that tribal court decree was entitled to full faith and
credit because Indian child was domiciled on that tribal reservation). Nor does 5 1738 of title 28
of the United States Code, require state courts to give full faith and credit to tribal laws and
judgments. See 28 U.S.C. S1738 (1982); accord Malaterre v. Malaterre. 293 N.W.2d 139. 144 (N.D.
1980) (tribal courts are not bound to enforce state court orders because full faith and credit clause
applies only to states). Of course, when appropriate, a state court could recognize and apply tribal
law under the doctrine of comity. See.Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362., 533 P.2d 751,
752 (1975) (recognizing that full faith and credit should be applied to Indian laws although "full faith
and credit is not a inexorable or unqualified command"). But the tribal government and its court,
which normally function unfettered by either federal or state constitutional constraints, may not
meet the due process prerequisite necessary for recognition of tribal law under a comity theory. See
Malatrre,293 N.W.2d at 145.
81. See, e.g., In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 71, 495 P.2d 179, 182 (1972) (declining to abide by a
tribal court's prior determination of parental fitness).
82. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1911 (d) (1982) (granting full faith and credit to the public records, acts, and
judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe that apply to an Indian child custody proceeding).
83. See id. S 1901(4); 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 59, at 1;Guideline A. 1, supra
note 35, at 67,585-86.
84. See 25 U.S.C. S 1902 (1982).
85. .e id.
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placement of removed children in foster care or adoptive homes
that reflect the unique values of Indian culture. 86 Among other
things, the Act changed state laws and procedures that had
previously made it easy to remove an Indian child from his or her
87
family and tribe.

III. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978
Enacted into law on November 8, 1978,18 the Indian Child
Welfare Act contains three major groups of provisions. One
subchapter provides a means for the Secretary of Interior to
establish Indian child and family programs. 89 Unfortunately, the
Act does not provide funding for these programs. 90 Given the
86. See id.
87. Removal of Indian children from their families frequently occurred in situations in which
one or more of the following conditions existed:
(1) The natural parent does not understand the nature of the documents or

proceedings involved;
(2) neither the child nor the natural parents are represented by counsel or
otherwise advised of their rights;
(3) the public officials involved are unfamiliar with, and often disdainful of,
Indian culture and society;
(4) the conditions which led to the separation are not demonstrably harmful or
are remediable or transitory in character; and
(5) responsible tribal authorities and Indian community agencies are not
consulted about or even informed of the actions.
See 1977 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 59, at 539. Not surprisingly, these conditions were
particular targets for the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. See id.
88. 25 U.S.C. 5 1923 (1982). The IOWA was not, however, generally effective until 180 days
after its enactment:
None of the provisions of this subchapter, except sections 1911 (a), 1918, and 1919
of this title, shall affect a proceeding under State law for foster care placement,
termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement which
was initiated or completed prior to one hundred and eighty days after November 8,
1978, but shall apply to any subsequent proceeding in the same matter or subsequent
proceedings affecting the custody or placement of the same child.
See id. Section 1911(a) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal court in child custody proceedings
when the child is either domiciled upon or resides within an Indian reservation, or is a ward of the
tribal court. See id. S 191 l(a). For a discussion of the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts, see infra
note 129-30 and accompanying text. Sections 1918 and 1919 refer, respectively, to tribal
reassumption of jurisdiction from states, and agreements between states and tribes on child custody
matters. See id. SS 1918-1919. For a discussion of tribal reassumption ofjurisdiction, see supra note 6
and accompanying text. For a discussion of agreements between states and tribes, see supra note 37
and accompanying text. Two other provisions of the Act are also made specifically applicable to preAct child custody proceedings. Retroactive application is given to an Indian adoptee's right to
information about his or her natural parents and tribe. See id. S 1951(a). For a discussion of this
retroactive application, see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. The other retroactive
application relates to post-Act changes that modify a pre-Act child custody proceeding in any
manner. See id. § 1916. For a discussion of this retroactive application of the IOWA, see infra notes
117-25 and accompanying text.
89. See 25 U.S.C. S5 1931 to -34 (1982); 25 C.F.R. SS 23.21-23.71 (1986).
90. Money for implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act must be appropriated through
the Snyder Act. See 25 U.S.C. S 13 (1982).
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present federal budgetary concerns,9 1 this absence of a specific
funding source will undoubtedly retard the establishment of Indian
child and family programs, as well as hinder the continued
92
effectiveness of any programs that are established.
A second subchapter requires any state court that enters a final
decree or order in an Indian child adoptive placement to provide
93
the Secretary of Interior with a copy of its decree or order,
together with the identity and location of the child's natural parents
and adoptive parents. 94 The state court must also inform the
Secretary of the child's name, birthdate, Indian blood quantum,
tribal affiliation, 5 and the identity of any agency that has files or
96
information relating to the adoption.
Once the adopted child reaches the age of eighteen, he or she is
entitled to obtain the information provided by the state court. 97 The
91. See Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Star. 1037
(1985) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901 to -22); see also 131 Cong. Rec. S17381 (daily ed. Dec. 11,
1985) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (discussing the Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and the
need to control the federal deficit), reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AoMIN. NEWS 1049-54.
92. When the ICWA was proposed, theL~ongressional Budget Office submitted a five year
capital program for implementing the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 29. This
plan required an appropriation to build and staff 150 special Indian-controlled child development
centers. See id. Although barely adequate to achieve the desired goals, the money was never
appropriated for this plan. In fact, the ICWA programs have experienced "barebones" federal
funding. See 1984 Indian Child Welfare Hearing, supra note 3 1, at 5 (statement ofJohn W. Fritz, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs). At one time the present administration proposed to drop the
funding of off-reservation programs (programs for Indians that are performed off Indian
reservations) because these could conceivably receive funding from other sources. Id. at 7; see also id.
at 75-77 (statement of Steven Unger, Executive Director, AAIA about Indian Child Welfare
programs being underfunded).
93. 25 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982). The state court must provide a copy of this decree or order,
together with all other required information, within 30 days after its entry of the decree or order. 25
C.F.R. S 23.81(a) (1986). This information and copies of any necessary documents must be
transmitted by the state court to: Chief, Division of Social Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1951
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20245. Id. S 23.81(a)(3). A state can designate a
state agency to be the repository for all state court Indian adoption information and if this is done,
that agency may assume the responsibility for meeting the ICWA's reporting requirements. See id.
But regardless of which state entity bears the reporting responsibilities in any particular case, the
Secretary of Interior's regulations provide that all information on state Indian adoptions should be
transmitted to the Division of Social Services in an envelope marked "Confidential." Id.
94. See 25 U.S.C. S 1951(a) (1982); 25 C.F.R. S 2 3 .8 1(aX2) (1986).
95. See 25 U.S.C. S 1951(a) (1982); 25 C.F.R. S 23.81(a)(1) (1986).
96. See 25 U.S.C. S1951(a) (1982); 25 C.F.R. $ 23.81(a)(3) (1986).
97. The Bureau of Indian Affairs' Division of Social Services is the agency authorized to receive
all information on state Indian adoptions. 25 C.F.R. § 23.81(b). Division of Social Services' Indian
adoption files are confidential and only designated persons may have access to them. Id. However,
an adopted Indian individual over the age of 18, his or her adoptive or foster parents, or Indian tribe
are all authorized to have access to the Division of Social Services information concerning that
adopted individual. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. S 1917 (1982) (right to information from state); id. § 1951(b)
(right to information from Secretary of Interior); 25 C.F.R. § 23.81(b) (1986). A state's disclosure of
this information to an adult adoptee is covered by the following guideline:
(a) Upon application by an Indian individual who has reached age 18 who was
the subject of an adoptive placement, the court which entered the final decree must
inform such individual of the tribal affiliations, if any[, I of the individual's biological
parents and provide such other information necessary to protect any rights flowing
from the individual's tribal relationship.
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information is intended to enable the adopted Indian child to
reestablish his or her tribal identity. 98 Of course, if the natural
parent has requested anonymity, the Secretary is authorized to
certify the child's tribal affiliation and other circumstances of the
child's birth without disclosing the natural parent's identity. 99
It is, however, the third major subdivision of the ICWA that
should most concern social workers, practitioners, and judges. In
this section, Congress established the standards for removal and
placement of Indian children into preadoptive, adoptive, or foster
homes.
Initially, it is important to emphasize that application of these
federal standards is dependent upon the term "Indian child." 10 0
The Act only applies to Indian children. 10 ' An Indian child is
defined as one who is unmarried, under the age of eighteen, and
either: (1) an enrolled member of an Indian tribe; 10 2 or (2) if not
(b) The section applies regardless of whether or not the original adoption was
subject to the provisions of the Act.
(c) Where state law prohibits revelation of the identity of the biological parent,
assistance of the Bureau of Indian Affairs shall be sought where necessary to help an
adoptee who is eligible for membership in a tribe establish that right without breaching
the confidentiality of the record.

Guideline G.2, supra note 35, at 67,595.
98. See Guideline G.2 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,595; 25 C.F.R. 5 23.8 l(b) (1986).
99. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1951(b) (1982). A biological parent's request for confidentiality is made by
an "affidavit of confidentiality." See 25 C.F.R. 5 23.81 (1986). When a biological parent has
requested that his or her identity remain confidential, a copy of the affidavit of confidentiality shall
be provided to the Secretary through the standard reporting channels. The affidavit should be
transmitted in an envelope marked by the sender as "Confidential." See 25 C.F.R. 5 23.81(aX3)
(1986). This affidavit is not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act, and the Secretary is specifically charged with the duty to insure that the affidavit remains
confidential. Id. The Freedom of Information Act is located in 5 552, title 5 of the United States
Code. See 5 U.S.C. S 552 (1982). It should be noted, however, that a parent's affidavit of
confidentiality is in addition to any state laws that may prohibit the disclosure of information about
an adoptee's biological parents. Compare Guideline G.2 and commentary, supra note 35, at 67,595
(state laws against disclosure) with 25 C.F.R. 5 23.81(b) (1986) (affidavit of confidentiality). For
further discussion of the confidentiality the ICWA grants to a biological parent's identity, see infra
notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
100. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1902 (1982) (congressional declaration of policy); Guideline A, supra note

35, at 67,585-86.
101. The Indian Child Welfare Act does not expressly provide that the Act is limited to Indian
children. The Act, however, refers only to Indian children. E.g., 25 U.S.C. 1912(a) (1982). For a
discussion of the definition of Indian children pursuant to the Act, see infa notes 102-03 and
accompanying text.
102. The Act defines "Indian tribe" as: "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized
group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the
Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in section
1602(c) of Title 43." 25 U.S.C. 5 1903(8) (1982). No definition for "Alaska Native" is contained in
the ICWA. Instead, reference is made to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which established
a permanent roll of Alaska Natives living in 1971. See id. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is
contained in 51604, title 43 of the United States Code. See 43 U.S.C. S1604 (1982). The ICWA does
not apply to Canadian Indians, nor to Mexican Indians, but it has been suggested that non-United
States tribes might come within the purview of the Act if they are affiliated with a federally
recognized tribe. See In reJunious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786, 792, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (1983).
Congress has also terminated or dissolved a number of tribes. See, e.g., Act ofJune 17, 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-399, 68 Stat. 250 (withdrawal of Menominee Tribe from federal jurisdiction); Act of Aug. 13,
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enrolled, the biological child of a tribal member and the child is
eligible for membership. 10 3 Applicability of the Indian Child
Welfare Act is additionally complicated by the absence of a-uniform
national standard for tribal membership.
Congress has provided a blood quantum ancestry definition of
"Indian" in other contexts, 10 4 but chose not to do so in the ICWA.
Instead, the Act's definition of Indian is synonymous with tribal
membership, and the tribes themselves determine who may
become a member. 10 5 While most of the North Dakota tribes
require a significant quantum of Indian blood for membership, 0 6
this is not true of all tribes. Some tribes have set the percentage of
1954, Pub. L. Nos. 83-587, -588, -627, 68 Stat. 718, 724, 768 (termination of the Klamath Tribe,
tribes located in western Oregon, and the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas). The ICWA
does not affect child custody proceedings involving members of these terminated tribes. See 25
U.S.C. 55 1902-03 (1982).
103. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1903(4) (1982). Before any provisions of the ICWA apply, it must be
established on the record that the child meets either or both of the definitional criteria for an Indian
child. See InreAppeal in Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. 528, -,
667 P.2d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1983)
(stating that the ICWA would not apply unless the child was Indian, defined as "(1) a member of an
Indian tribe or (2) a biological child of a member and eligible for membership in a tribe"). When the
pleadings do not contain allegations that the child is Indian, then the party asserting this bears the
burden of proof. See In reK.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d 840, 843 (S.D. 1982); accord In reJ.B., 643 P.2d
306, 307-08 (Okla. 1982) (natural mother claiming benefit of ICWA had burden of proving that
child was an Indian and thus entitled to the protections of that Act). If the allegation is in the
pleadings, however, the court will assume that the ICWA applies. See In reK.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d at
843. A party's admission during the custody proceedings that the child is an Indian may be binding,
and sufficient to trigger the state court's application of the ICWA. See A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d
1170, 1174 (Alaska 1982).
Once it is determined that the state proceedings involve an Indian child, the state court should
make specific findings to that effect. Based upon these findings the court should conclude, as a matter
of law, that the proceedings are governed by the ICWA. See In reK.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d at 843. It
should be emphasized, however, that when there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the child's status
as an Indian, this issue is not determined by the state court. See In reJunious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d
786, 790-93, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 41-43 (1983). Whether a child is an Indian can only be determined
by the tribe to which he or she purportedly belongs, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. For a discussion
of the procedure for obtaining tribal or BIA determination of a child's Indian status, see infra notes
134-,36 and accompanying text. In the case of a child born out of wedlock to a non-Indian mother,
the ICWA does not apply until such time as the putative father either acknowledges or establishes his
paternity. In reAppeal in Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. 528, -- ,667 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App.
1983).
104. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 5 479 (1982) (defining Indians under the Indian Reorganization Act to
include "persons of one-half or more Indian blood").
105. See id. S1903(3) ('"Indian' means any person who isa member of an Indian tribe"). The
most common means of proving tribal membership is to show that a person is enrolled in a tribe,
but the guidelines make it clear that enrollment'is not the only means of establishing tribal
membership. See Guideline B. 1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,586. Nor is it conclusive:
Enrollment is not always required in order to be a member of a tribe. Some tribes
do not have written rolls. Others have rolls that list only persons that were members as
of a certain date. Enrollment is the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian
status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative.
Id.

106. See, e.g., DEviLs LAKE Sioux CONSr. art. III, 5 1(c) ("one-fourth or more degree Indian
blood"); SISSEToN-WAHPZ'TON Sioux CoNST. art. II, 5 l(d) ("one-eighth (1/8) degree or more
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Indian blood"); STANONo ROCK SIOUX CONST. art. IV, I ("one-quarter
(1/4) degree Yankton Sioux Indian blood"); TUaTLE MouwrAIN BAND OF CHIePEWA CONST. art. III,
5 l(b) ("one-fourth or more Indian blood").
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Indian blood required for membership so low that a member's
Indian blood is virtually nonexistent. 0 7 Other tribes extend
membership to any descendent of a member regardless of Indian
blood quantum. 08 The net effect of this variable standard for tribal
membership is that many children considered to be Indian under
the ICWA do not, by physical features, reveal their Indian
heritage. Consequently, state judges, social workers, and attorneys
often do not recognize that they are handling the case of a child who
is subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Many times those involved with the placement of an Indian
child are working with the unwed mother, who happens to be nonIndian. This will not, however, excuse the practitioner for
proceeding in violation of ICWA requirements. Ignorance of the
child's Indian status is no excuse. The Act places the burden upon
judges, lawyers, and caseworkers to insure compliance with its
procedures, 0 9 and failure to do so may have rather onerous
consequences for all involved.1 ' 0
The ICWA procedures that judges, attorneys, and caseworkers must be concerned with fall into six fairly well defined
categories: (1) tribal court jurisdiction;"' (2) tribal intervention in
state court proceedings; 1 2 (3) standards of proof;' 1 3 (4) placement
preferences;"14 (5) parental rights;" 5 and (6) enforcement and post
trial rights."I6 These procedures generally do not apply to child
custody proceedings commenced or completed prior to May 7,
8
1979,11 7 unless there has been a post-Act placement change."1
107. See, e.g., FORT INDEPENDENCE INDIAN COMMUNITY ARTICLE OP ASSOCIATION art. II, 5 l(b)
("1/16 degree Indian blood"); MISSION CREEK BAND CONST. art. I, 1 l(b) ("at least 1/16 degree
Indian blood"); OTrAWA CoNsT. art. Il, 5 l(d) ("one-sixteenth or more degree of Indian blood").
108. See, e.g., THREE AIFILIATED TRIBES CoNsT. art. 11, 5 1 ("all persons of Indian blood").
109. For a discussion of the court's and counsel's obligation to determine whether a child is an
Indian within the meaning of the ICWA, see infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of the Act's remedies and enforcement procedures, see infta notes 291-314
and accompanying text.

S111.
See 25 U.S.C. S 191 l(a) (1982).
112. See id. S5 1911(b), (c), 1912(a).
113. Seeid. $ 1912(e), (f).
114. See id. 51915.
115. See id. 55 1912(a), (b), 1913.
116. Seeid. S5 1913(d), 1914, 1916.
117. See id. 5 1923; In re R.N., D.N., L.N., H.N., & S.N., 303 N.W.2d 102, 103 (S.D. 1981).
For a detailed discussion of the retroactive application of the ICWA, see supra note 88.
118. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1916 (1982). Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the
ICWA to apply to any "subsequent discrete phase of the same matter." See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386,
supra note 65, at 26. The law does not apply to mere post-Act continuations of a pre-ICWA case. See

In re T.J.D., J.L.D. & RJ.W., 189 Mont. 147,

-,

615 P.2d 212, 217 (1980). It is, however,

sometimes difficult to determine whether the post-Act proceedings in a case commenced prior to the
enactment of the ICWA or is a mere continuation or a subsequent discrete phase. See, e.g., E.A. v.

State, 623 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Alaska 1981) (post-Act physical placement of Indian child did not
trigger ICWA, but mandatory post-Act hearing before adoption became final was an ICWA

proceeding).
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Thus, even though the initial placement was pre-Act, if a child is
removed from a foster home and not returned to the parents or
Indian custodian from whom the child was originally removed, any
further foster care or adoptive placement is governed by the
ICWA."t 9 Likewise, in the event a pre-Act adoption is set aside for
any reason, the Indian Child Welfare Act applies to all future

120
placements of that child.

Furthermore, in the unlikely event the adoption of an Indian
child is either vacated or the adoptive parents consent to the
termination of their parental rights, a biological parent or prior
Indian custodian may petition for return of the child. 12 1 Moreover,
the ICWA gives legal standing to a biological parent or prior
1 22
Indian custodian to seek the return of a child if an adoption fails.
The state court must grant this request unless it finds that such
action would not be in the child's best interest. 123 Also, all post
adoption proceedings, from the setting aside of an adoption to the
future placement of the Indian child, are governed by the
ICWA. 124 The guidelines provide that an Indian child's biological
parent or prior Indian custodian is entitled to notice of such

119. See 25 U.S.C. S 1916(b) (1982); see also, e.g., State ex rel. J.L.G., 687 P.2d 477, 479 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984) (when initial placement was prior to effective date of Act, ICWA did not govern
subsequent state proceedings involving that child unless the subsequent proceedings involved a
different foster care home, an attempt to terminate parental rights, or a preadoptive or adoptive
placement).
120. See25 U.S.C. S 1916(a)(1982).
121. See id. The Bureau of Indian Affairs will assist in locating the biological parents or prior
Indian custodian of an adopted Indian child whose adoption has been terminated. See 25 C.F.R. S
23.93 (1986). The North Dakota Child Placement Agency, state court, or tribe can request this
assistance, and their request should be sent to: Aberdeen Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
115 - 4th Avenue, S.E., Aberdeen, South Dakota 57401. Id. §§ 23.1 l(b)(3), 23.93. The foregoing is.
also the address for South Dakota courts and agencies to request BIA assistance in locating the
child's natural parents or prior Indian custodian. See id. For Minnesota proceedings, this request
should be mailed by the state court, tribe, or agency to: Minneapolis Area Director, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Chamber of Commerce Building - 6th Floor, 15 South Fifth Street, Minneapolis,
Minnesota 55402. See id. §5 23.11(b)(2), 23.93. When it is a Montana adoption that has been
terminated, requests for assistance should be directed to: Billings Area Director, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 316 N. 26th Street, Billings, Montana 59101. See id. §§ 23.1 1(bX5), 23.93. Requests for
assistance from Wyoming attorneys and judges can be sent to the Montana address. See id. For
Idaho, Oregon, or Washington proceedings, persons seeking assistance must write to: Portland Area
Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1425 N.E. Irving Street, Portland, Oregon 97208. See aS. 5S
23.11 (bX11), 23.93. When the proceeding takes place in Utah, anyone seeking BIA help has two
addresses with which to be concerned. If the action is in Utah's San Juan County, requests for
assistance must be sent to: Navajo Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Window Rock, Arizona
86515. See id. 5S 23.11 (b)(9), 23.93. Elsewhere in Utah, requests from judges, attorneys, or social
workers should be addressed to: Phoenix Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, P.O. Box 7007,
Phoenix, Arizona 85011. See id. SS 23.11 (bXlO), 23.93. The foregoing addresses are extremely
important, for they are the regional BIA Directors upon whom many of the notices required by the
ICWA must be served. See25 C.F.R. § 23.1 1(a) (1986).
122. See Guideline G.3 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,595.
123. See 25 U.S.C. S 1916(a) (1982).
124. See id.
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proceedings. 125 The notice, however, may be waived, but the
1 26
waiver is not absolute.
The parent's or Indian custodian's ability to retract his or her
waiver of the right to notice is further evidence of the protections
given them by the ICWA. Although the Act allows the Indian
child's parents or custodians to waive their rights created under this
law, waivers of rights- are not favored.1 27 Hence, the Act
provides parents and Indian custodians with the liberal right to
1 28
revoke their waivers.
A. TRIBAL COURTJURISDICTION
The tendency of state courts to ignore tribal court authority in
Indian child custody cases is no longer permissible under the
ICWA. State courts handling an ICWA proceeding are required to
determine the residence and domicile of any Indian child before
them.129 If the Indian child either resides or is domiciled on an
125. See Guideline G.3, supra note 35, at 67,595. The guidelines state the following with*regard
to an Indian child's biological parent's or prior Indian custodian's right to notice of a post adoptive
proceeding:
(a) Whenever a final decree of adoption of an Indian child has been vacated or set
aside, or the adoptive parent has voluntarily consented to the termination of his or her
parental rights to the child, or whenever an Indian child is removed from a foster care
home or institution for the purpose of further foster care, preadoptive placement, or
adoptive placement, notice by the court or an agency authorized by the court shall be
given to the child's biological parents or prior Indian custodians. Such notice shall
inform the recipient of his or her right to petition for return of custody of the child.
(b) A parent or Indian custodian may waive his or her right to such notice by
executing a written waiver of notice filed with the court. Such waiver vmay be revoked at any
time by filing wit the court a written notice of revocation, but such revocation would not affect any
proceedingwhich occurredbfore thefiling of the notice of revocation.
Id. (emphasis added).
126. See id.
127. See id. The Act is silent on the question of whether a parent or Indian custodian can waive
the right to future notice, but guideline G.3 recognizes that:
Obviously, there will be cases in which the biological parents will prefer not to receive
notice once their parental rights have been relinquished or terminated. This section

provides for such waivers but, because the Act establishes an absolute right to
participate in any future proceedings and to petition the court for return of the child,
the waiver is revocable.
Id.
128. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. S 1913(c) (1982) (allowing parents to withdraw their consent anytime
prior to entry of the final decree of termination or adoption). For a complete discussion of the
withdrawal of parental consent to the adoption of or the termination of rights to an Indian child, see
infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text. The Act even permits Indian tribes to withdraw any
jurisdiction over child custody matters that was previously given to a state. For procedural details of
a tribe's withdrawal of jurisdiction from the state in child custody matters, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
129. See Guideline B. 1, supra note 35, at 67,586. The Act does not contain a definition for the
terms "residence" or "domicile." These definitions were not included because Congress was aware
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Indian reservation, or is the ward of a tribal court, the Act, with
few exceptions, vests that reservation court system with the
exclusive jurisdiction in custody proceedings. ,30
Furthermore, the Act requires a state judge to initiate an
inquiry whenever he or she has reason to believe that an Indian
child is involved. '3,A judge is deemed to have reason to make this
inquiry when:
(i) Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian
organization or public or private agency informs the court
that the child is an Indian child.
(ii) Any public or state licensed agency involved in
child protection services or family support has discovered
information which suggests that the child is an Indian
child.
(iii) The child who is the subject of the proceeding
gives the court reason to believe he or she is an Indian
child.
(iv) The residence or the domicile of the child, his or
her biological parents, or the Indian custodian is known
by the court to be or is shown to be a predominantly
Indian community.

that they were well defined under existing state law, and there was no indication that these state law
definitions undermined the ICWA. See Guideline, supra note 35, at 67,585. Under North Dakota
law, the term " residence" is synonymous with "domicile," and the legal residence of the surviving,
supporting parent is the domicile of an unmarried minor child. B.R.T. v. Executive Director of
Social Serv. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 598 (N.D. 1986).
130. See 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(a) (1982). The exceptions to exclusive tribal jurisdiction are those
states that acquired authority in this area pursuant to Public Law 83-280, and the emergency
removal power which the ICWA specifically gives state courts. For a discussion of jurisdiction
assumed pursuant to Public Law 83-280, see supr note 6. For a discussion of the emergency removal
jurisdiction, see infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text. When the tribal court is given exclusive
jurisdiction and the state proceedings do not involve an emergency removal, the state court is totally
without jurisdiction. See, e.g., In reAppeal in Pima CountyJuvenile Action, 130 Ariz. 202, -, 635
P.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1981) (although the child was in Arizona with the adoptive parents, the
child's domicle was that of the natural mother who resided on a Montana reservation; hence, even
though the adoption had initially been consented to, the Arizona courts had no jurisdiction in the
matter), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Inre Baby Child, 102 N.M. 735,-, 700 P.2d 198, 20001 (Ct. App. 1983) (because the child was domiciled on an Indian reservation, the natural mother
could not consent to a state court adoption).
The guidelines are very clear on the matter of exclusive jurisdiction. If the child is either a
resident of or domiciled upon a reservation where the tribal court is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction, or that child is a ward of the tribal court, then the state action must be dismissed. See
Guideline B.4, supra note 35, at 67,588. This congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to tribal
courts does not violate the tenth amendment, or otherwise result in a denial of due process or equal
protection. See In reD.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980).
131. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1912(a) (1982); Guideline B.l(a) and commentary, supra note 35, at
67,586. The guidelines recommend that state courts routinely inquire of participants in child custody
proceedings whether the child is an Indian. See Guideline B.5(a) and commentary at 67,588-89.
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(v) An officer of the court involved in the proceeding
132
has knowledge that the child may be an Indian child.
This is not a complete list of the circumstances in which both state
courts and attorneys must inquire into a child's Indian status, but it
give rise to a
does contain the most common occurrences 3that
3
reasonable belief that a child may be an Indian. 1
Once the court has grounds to believe that the child is an
Indian, it "shall seek verification of the child's status from either
the

Bureau

of Indian

Affairs

or the

child's tribe. 1 '

34

A

determination by the tribe that the child is or is not a member of
that tribe, and otherwise is or is not the biological child of a member
and therefore eligible for membership, is conclusive on the issue. 135
In the absence of the tribe's determination on the question of
membership, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has the power to
conclusively decide whether a child is or is not an Indian for
purposes of the ICWA.

3 6

The Act generally applies to both voluntary and involuntary
removal proceedings, but a parent's request for confidentiality3 is
7
given much higher priority in a voluntary proceeding.
Subsection 1915(c) of the ICWA specifically directs that in
voluntary placements state courts must respect parental requests
for confidentiality.138 If a parent requests anonymity the state court
must seek information concerning the child's ancestry in a manner
132. See Guideline B. 1(c), supra note 35, at 67,586.
133. See Guideline B. I commentary, supra note 35, at 67,586. Guideline B. I gives circumstances
under which a state court should notice that a child is an Indian child. Guideline B. 1,supra note 35,
at 67,586. These circumstances are not, however, exclusive. See id.
134. See Guideline B. l(a), supra note 35, at 67,586. An Indian child is defined under the ICWA
as a child that is a member of a federally recognized tribe, or eligible for membership in such a tribe.
See 25 U.S.C. 5 1903(4) (1982). For a discussion of the definitions of "Indian child" and "Indian,"
see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. Tribal membership is a matter for the tribe or BIA to
determine, not the state court. See In rejunious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786, 790-93, 193 Cal. Rptr.
40, 41-43 (1983).
135. See Guideline B. l(bXi), supra note 35, at 67,586. But see In re Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199,
-,
643 P.2d 168, 174, 176 (1982) (refusing to apply ICWA provisions to adoption proceedings
involving non-Indian mother's illegitimate child because that child had never been in the care or
custody of his Indian father, nor otherwise part of any Indian family). The illegitimate children of
non-Indian mothers are not subject to the ICWA's provisions until such time as their Indian putative
father either acknowledges his paternity, or paternity is otherwise established. For a discussion of this
and similar questions, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
136. See Guideline B.l(bXii), supra note 35, at 67, 586.
137. See Guideline B.I commentary, supra note 35, at 67,586. The Act mandates a tribal right of
notice and intervention in involuntary proceedings, but not in voluntary ones. Compare 25 U.S.C. S
1912 (1982) (involuntary state actions) with id. 5 1913 (voluntary state proceedings). A parent's
request for confidentiality is made by an "affidavit of confidentiality," which is discussed supra note
99.
138. 25 U.S.C. 5 1915(c) (1982). The most common voluntary placement is a newborn infant.
See Guideline B.I commentary, supra note 35, at 67,586. Confidentiality regarding the infant's
natural parents has traditionally been a high priority in newborn placements, and the Act continues
this tradition by:
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that will not cause the parent's identity to become known. 139 Thus,
even though tribal verification of a child's membership is preferred,
a state court may want to seek verification from the BIA in those
placement cases in which the parent has asked to remain
anonymous and the tribe does not have a system for keeping
paternity matters secret. 140
When it is established that a child is Indian, and is either
residing or domiciled on the reservation, or a ward of the tribal
court, the state court has no jurisdiction to proceed.141 This absence
of jurisdiction is subject to one exception, however, which
142
authorizes removal of Indian children in an emergency situation.
State courts are permitted to temporarily remove children from
their parents or Indian custodian when the children are faced with
the likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage.1 43 This
emergency removal authority only exists, however, when an
endangered child, otherwise subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction,
is physically located off the reservation.1 4 4 The tribal court usually
will not be able to act quickly enough to protect the child in these
emergency situations, and for that reason Congress has authorized
states to take temporary protective custody. 145
When counsel asks a state court for an order of emergency
custody of an Indian child, the petition for that order should be
accompanied by an affidavit containing detailed information
concerning the child, the child's parents or Indian custodian, the
child's tribe, and the proceedings.1 46 Absent extraordinary
[R]equiring deference to requests for anonymity in voluntary placements but not in
involuntary ones. This guideline specifically provides that anonymity not be
compromised in seeking verification of Indian status. If anonymity were compromised
at that point, the statutory requirement that requests for anonymity by respected in
applying the preferences would be meaningless.

Id.
139. See Guideline B. l(a), supra note 35, at 67,586.
140. See Guideline B. 1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,586.
141. See 25 U.S.C. S 1911(a) (1982). For further discussion of a tribal court's exclusive
jurisdiction, see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. See id. 5 1922.
143. See id.
144. See id.; Guideline B.7 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,590.
145. See Guideline B.7 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,590.
146. Id. This accompanying affidavit must contain the following information:
(i) The name, age and last known address of the Indian child.
(ii) The name and address of the child's parents and Indian custodians, if any. If
such persons are unknown, a detailed explanation of what efforts have been made to
locate them shall be included.
(iii) Facts necessary to determine the residence and the domicile of the Indian
child and whether either the residence or domicile is on an Indian reservation. If either
the residence or domicile is believed to be on an Indian reservation, the name of the
reservation shall be stated.
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circumstances, the temporary emergency custody is not to continue
for more than ninety days without a determination by the state
court "that custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.' '147 The state court's decision in this matter must be based
upon "clear and convincing evidence and the testimony of at least
one qualified expert witness.' '148
Placements under this emergency procedure are to be as short
as possible. 49 If the emergency ends, the placement must end.15 0 A
state court's jurisdiction should likewise end as soon as the child's
tribe is ready to take over the proceedings. '51
The role of tribal courts in Indian child custody proceedings is
significantly strengthened by the ICWA in several other ways. If a
state court has reason to believe that an Indian child was
improperly removed from a tribal court's jurisdiction, it is required
to immediately stay its proceedings until a determination can be
made on the question of improper removal. 5 2 If the court finds that
(iv) The tribal affiliation of the child and of the parents and/or Indian custodians.
(v) A specific and detailed account of the circumstances that led the agency
responsible for the emergency removal of the child to take that action.
(vi) If the child is believed to reside or be domiciled on a reservation where the
tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters, a statement of efforts
that have been made and are being made to transfer the child to the tribe's
jurisdiction.
(vii) A statement of the specific actions that have been taken to assist the parents
or Indian custodians so the child may safely be returned to their custody.
Id.
147. Guideline B.7(d), supra note 35, at 67,589. In its entirety, guideline B.7(d) provides that:
Absent extraordinary circumstances, temporary emergency custody shall not be
continued for more than 90 days without a determination by the court supported by
clear and convincing evidence and the testimony of at least one qualified expert
witness, that custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
Id. at 67,589-90. This subsection recommends what is, in effect, a speedy trial requirement:
"[Clourt shall be required to comply with the requirements of the Act and reach a decision within 90
days unless there are 'extraordinary circumstances' that make additional delay unavoidable." Sei
Guideline B.7 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,590. The guidelines state that, unless some time
limit is placed upon the "emergency removal," the safeguards of the ICWA could be evaded by state
courts' use of long term emergency placements. Id.
148. See Guideline B.7(d), supra note 35, at 67,589-90.
149. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 25; Guideline B.7 commentary, supra note 35,
at 67,590.
150. See Guideline B.7(c), supra note 35, at 67,589.
151. See id.
152. See 25 U.S.C. S 1920 (1982); Guideline B.8(a), supra note 35, at 67,590. Guideline B.8(a)
provides as follows:
If, in the course of any Indian child custody proceeding, the court has reason to
believe that the child who is the subject of the proceeding may have been improperly
removed from the custody of his or her parent or Indian custodian or that the child has
been improperly retained after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of custody,
and that the petitioner is responsible for such removal or retention, the court shall
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the petitioner in a state proceeding has improperly removed or
retained the child, 153 that child must be immediately returned to his
or her parent or Indian custodian unless doing so "would subject
the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat of such
danger.''154 This provision of the ICWA certainly discourages

anyone from manufacturing state court jurisdiction by improperly
changing a child's domicile to an off-reservation address.
One of the most important aspects of the ICWA is the
recognition that it grants to tribal court orders and decrees.
Subsection 1911(d) of the Act requires the United States, states,
territories, and even other Indian tribes to give full faith and credit
to tribal custody proceedings and applicable tribal laws. 155 This
provision should prevent courts from ignoring prior tribal court
orders and decrees in custody proceedings simply because the
Indian child is off the reservation and under state jurisdiction. 156
B.

TRIBAL INTERVENTION IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

When an Indian child is residing off the reservation and is not
a ward of the tribal court, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the tribe. 157 Of course, if the tribal court has previously
immediately stay the proceedings until a determination can be made on the question of
improper removal or retention.
Id. This guideline is designed to implement S 1920 of title 25 of the United States Code. See 25
U.S.C. 5 1920 (1982) (ICWA's improper removal provision); see also Guideline B.8 commentary,
supra note 35, at 67,590. Since a finding of improper removal goes to the heart of state jurisdiction,
guideline B.8 requires state courts to decide the issue as soon as it arises and before proceeding
to the merits. See id.
Neither S 1920 of the Act, nor the guidelines, address the matter of improper removal of an
Indian child by a person other than the petitioning party in the state court proceedings. See 25
U.S.C. S 1920 (1982); Guideline B.8, supra note 35, at 67,590. Congress, however, considered S
1920 to be the equivalent of the "clean hands doctrine." See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65,
at 25. Hence, state courts should have great latitude in declining jurisdiction in those cases in which
the petitioning party did not actually remove the child from its reservation domicile, but that party's
role in the affair was such that it would be unfair or unjust for the state proceedings to continue. See
id.
153. 25 U.S.C. 5 i920 (1982). A child is improperly retained when one who otherwise acquired
lawful temporary custody of a child refuses to return that child to his or her rightful custodian. See id.
154. See id.; Guideline B.8(b), supra note 35, at 67,590.
155. 25 U.S.C. 5191 l(d) (1982). Section 191 l(d) requires that:
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States,
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings
to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity.
Id.

156. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 21. Itwas Congress' intent that other
jurisdictions give tribal public acts, records, and judicial proceedings full faith and credit to the same
extent these jurisdictions extend full faith and credit in other circumstances. See id.
157. See 25 U.S.C. S 191 1(a) (1982).
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entered an order or decree regarding the child's adoptive or foster
care placement, then the tribal court order is entitled to full faith
and credit.15 8 But even when the tribal court has not previously
decided the issue, the ICWA provides that anyone who has legal
custody of the child is entitled to intervene as a matter of right in
the involuntary state child custody proceedings. 159 The Act also
provides the Indian child's tribe with the right to intervene in
16 0
involuntary proceedings.
State courts are required to routinely inquire into a child's
status as an Indian. 16' . In any involuntary proceeding in which the
court knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian, either
the court or the petitioning party must give notice to the child's
natural parents, Indian custodian, and tribe.' 62 This notice must
advise the recipients of the nature of the state court proceedings and
of their right to intervene. 163 Notice may be given by the court or
counsel but, at a minimum, it must be served by registered mail
with return receipt requested.164 It should be written in clear and
understandable language,1 65 and should include specific information concerning the child, his or her tribe, the nature of the
proceedings, and the rights of the parties involved. 66 Counsel
158. See id. S 1911(d).
159. See id. S 1911 (c). The Act does not appear to recognize a right of intervention in voluntary
child custody proceedings. See id.; id. S 1912(a). A right, however, may be found under state law. For
a discussion of the applicability of state recognized rights to ICWA proceedings, see infra note 270
and accompanying text.
160. See id. SS 1911 (c), 1912(a).
161. For a discussion of when and how a court must inquire into a child's status as an Indian,
see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. Guidelines B.5(a) also addresses the state's need to
make this inquiry, and it specifies as follows:
In any involuntary child custody proceeding, the state court shall make inquiries to
determine if the child involved is a member of an Indian tribe or if a parent of the child
is a member of an Indian tribe and the child is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe.
Guideline B.5(a), supra note 35, at 67,588.
162. See 25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982). When the child's natural parents are deceased, at least one
state court has held that the ICWA requires notice to the Indian grandparents. See In re Duncan v.
Wiley, 657 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982). Such an interpretation of the Act is certainly in
line with the guidelines' directive that this remedial law be liberally construed in favor of keeping
Indian children within their own families and tribes. See Guideline A. 1, supra note 35, at 67, 585-86.
Tribes are permitted to designate an agent for service of this notice. See 25 C.F.R. S 23.12
(1986). If no agent is designated, the petitioning party or state court should serve the tribal
chairman. See id. When a tribe does have an agent designated for service, the Secretary maintains a
current listing of such agents. See id. The names and addresses can be obtained by writing the
appropriate BIA Area Director at the address given in supra note 121. Notice, however, is not
required in voluntary placements. Cf 25 U.S.C. 5 1912(a) (1982) (not providing for a right to
intervene in voluntary placements).
163. See25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982).
164. Id.; Guideline B.5(b), supra note 35, at 67,588. Personal service is also permitted. See
Guideline B.5(e), supra note 35, at 67,588.
165. See Guideline B.5(b), supra note 35, at 67,588.
166. Id. Guideline B.5(b) recommends that the notice served upon natural parents, Indian
custodian, and tribe include the following information:
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should file the original or a copy of each notice sent pursuant to this
section, and all return receipts or other proof of service, with the
state court. 167
If the state judge or petitioning party has reason to believe that
a parent or Indian custodian is not likely to understand the contents
of the notice because of the recipient's inability to read and
comprehend written English, the notice should be sent to the BIA
agency nearest the intended recipient. 168 Notice served by the state
judge or counsel upon a BIA agency should be accompanied by a
request that personnel from that agency arrange to have the notice
explained to the parent or Indian custodian in the language he or
she understands. 169 If the natural parents, Indian custodian, or
tribe are either unknown or cannot be located, the ICWA requires
either the petitioner or the court to serve this notice upon the

(i) The name of the Indian child.
(ii) His or her tribal affiliation.
(iii) A copy of the petition, complaint or other document by which the proceeding
was initiated.
(iv) The name of the petitioner and the name and address of the petitioner's
attorney.
(v) A statement of the right of the biological parent or Indian custodians and the
Indian child's tribe to intervene in the proceeding.
(vi) A statement that if the parents or Indian custodians are unable to afford
counsel counsel will be appointed to represent them.
(vii) A statement of the right of the natural parents or Indian custodians and the
Indian child's tribe to have, on request, twenty days (or such additional time as may
be permitted under state law) to prepare for the proceedings.
(viii) The location, mailing address and telephone number of the court.
(ix) A statement of the right of the parents or Indian custodians or the Indian
child's tribe to petition the court to transfer the proceeding to the Indian child's tribal
court.

(x) The potential legal consequences of an adjudication on future custodial rights
of the parents or Indian custodians.
(xi) A statement in the notice to the tribe that since child custody proceedings are
usually conducted on a confidential basis, tribal officials should keep confidential the
information contained in the notice concerning the particular proceeding and not
reveal it to anyone who does not need the information in order to exercise the tribe's
right under the Act.
Id. But state courts apparently do not require strict compliance with the informational content
suggested in guideline B.5(b). See, e.g., In re S.Z., 325 N.W.2d 53, 55-56 (S.D. 1982) (although it did
not specifically mention the right to intervene, notice served upon tribe was sufficient because it
included affidavits about the parties and proceedings, and was termed as "notice to you under the
Indian Child Welfare Act").
167. See Guideline B.5(d), supra note 35, at 67,588. It is particularly important that counsel file
all pleadings, returns, and other matters in the state court proceeding. A state court can not base any
decision in an ICWA proceeding on a report or document that is not filed. For a discussion of the
requirement that documents be filed with the state court, see infta notes 178-202 and accompanying

text.
168. Guideline B.5(g), supra note 35, at 67,588. This notice is served upon the BIA at the
address provided in supra note 12 1. When requested by any party in a child custody proceeding or the
state court, the BIA will provide assistance in identifying interpreters. See 25 C.F.R. 5 23.92 (1986).
169. See 25 C.F.R. $ 23.92 (1986). This procedure is intended to increase the likelihood that
Indian parents and custodians understand their rights. See Guideline B.5 commentary, supranote 35,
at 67,589.
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Secretary of the Interior.1 7 0
Sometimes an Indian child may be eligible for membership in
more than one tribe, 171 but only the tribe in which he or she is
actually a member needs to be notified. 1 72 If the child is not a
member of any tribe but is eligible for membership in more than
one tribe, the law requires that the petitioner, his or her counsel, or
the court serve this notice upon the tribe with the most significant
contacts.1 73 But the Secretary of Interior recommends that counsel
or the court send notices to all tribes in which the child may be
eligible for membership. 174 This notice should advise all tribal
recipients that the court is considering them as the child's tribe, and
invite each tribe's input concerning which tribe should be
17 5
designated as the child's tribe.
In making the determination of which tribe has the most
significant contacts with the child, a state court can consider:
(i) [L]ength of residence on or near the reservation
of each tribe and frequency of contacts with each tribe;
(ii) child's participation in activities of each tribe;
(iii) child's fluency in the language of each tribe;
(iv) whether there has been a previous adjudication
with respect to the child by a court of one of the tribes;
(v) residence on or near one of the tribes'
reservation by the child's relatives;
(vi) tribal membership of custodial parent or Indian
custodian;
170. 25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982). In those states with a significant Indian population, the
authors recommend that the Secretary of Interior be served with an ICWA notice in every child
custody proceeding in which the child may be an Indian. Service upon the Secretary must be by
registered mail, return receipt requested. 25 C.F.R. S 23.11(a) (1986). The notice served upon the
Secretary must include the following information, if known:
(1) Name of the Indian child, birthdate, birthplace,
(2) Indian child's tribal affiliation,
(3) Names of Indian child's parents or Indian custodians, including birthdate,
birthplace, and mother's maiden name, and
(4) A copy of the petition, complaint or other document by which the proceeding
was initiated.
Id. 5 23.1 1(c). This notice should be mailed to the BIA Area Director at the address given in supra
note 121. Any potential participant in an anticipated Indian child custody proceeding may request
and receive the BIA's help in identifying and locating the child's parents, custodian, or tribe. See id.S
23.11(f).
171. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1903(4) (1982); Guideline B.2 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,587.
172. See 25 U.S.C. $ 1912(a) (1982).
173. Seeld. 551903(4), 1912(a); Guideline B.2(b), supra note 35, at 67,586.
174. Guideline B.2(b), supra note 35, at 67,586.
175. See id.
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(vii) interest asserted by each tribe in response to the
notice specified
in subsection B.2(b)
of these
guidelines; 1 76 and

(viii) the child's self identification.177
Once the state court reaches a conclusion on the matter of tribal
membership, it is required to set out the reasons for its decision in a
written document, which becomes part of the record in that
proceeding. 17 Court or counsel must then"serve this document on
all parties to the proceeding and on every natural person or
governmental entity that received notice of the proceeding.' 79 Only
the tribe determined to have the most significant contacts with the
child, however, has the right to intervene in the state court
action. 180
To protect the right of intervention granted to the natural
parents, tribe, and others, state custody proceedings cannot be held
until "at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or
Indian custodian and tribe or Secretary."' 8 ' Upon their receipt of

176. Guideline B.2(c), supra note 35, at 67,586. Guideline B.2(c) specifies that "[t]he court shall
send the notice specified in recommended guideline B.4 to each such tribe. The notice shall specify
the other tribe or tribes that are being considered as the child's tribe and invite each tribe's views on
which tribe shall be so designated." Guideline B.2(c), supra note 35, at 67,586-87.
177. Guideline B.2(c), supra note 35, at 67,587.
178. Guideline B.2(d), supra note 35, at 67,587. Each party to a foster care placement or
termination of parental rights proceeding in a state court has the right to examine any reports or
other documents filed with the state court and upon which any decision of that court was based. See
25 U.S.C. 5 1912(c) (1982); Guideline D.1, supra note 35, at 67,592. More importantly, though, the
state court may not base any decision in an Indian child custody proceeding upon matters not part of
the court record. See id.
179. See Guideline B.2(d), supra note 35, at 67,587.
180. See 25 U.S.C. 5 191 l(c) (1982); Guideline B.2 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,587. The
Secretary suggests, however, that:
A right of intervention could be accorded a tribe with which a child has less significant
contacts without undermining the right of the other tribe. A state court can, if it wishes
and state law permits, permit intervention by more than one tribe. It could also give a
second tribe preference in placement after attempts to place a child with a member of
the first tribe or in a home or institution designated by the first tribe had proved
unsuccessful. So long as the special rights of the Indian child's tribe are respected,
giving special status to the tribe with the less significant contacts is not prohibited by
the Act and may, in many instances, be a good way to comply with the spirit of the
Act.
Id.
A state court's determination that one tribe is the child's tribe does not serve as precedent for
other situations not arising under the ICWA proceedings. See id.Furthermore, the fact that an
Indian child changes tribal membership does not influence any action based on membership taken by
the state court prior to the child's change of membership. See Guideline B.2(e), supra note 35, at
67,587.
181. 25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982). The Secretary recommends that state courts begin counting
after the last party is notified. SeeGuideline B.6 and commentary, supra note 35, at 67,589.
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this notice, the Indian child's parents or custodian and the tribe
may request a stay of up to twenty additional days in order to
prepare for the custody proceeding. 8 2 When the child's parents,
legal custodian, and tribe are unknown, and notice is served upon
the Secretary of Interior, the Secretary is given fifteen days after
receipt to identify, locate, and notify the natural parents or Indian
3
custodian and tribe. 18
Congress undoubtedly felt that a waiting period was necessary
in order to protect the right of intervention; otherwise the state
custody proceeding would be concluded before the Indian parents,
custodian, or tribe could exercise their right. 8 4 It is clear that state
courts must comply with the time limits in the Act, and that the
state custody matter cannot proceed until the passing of the waiting
1 85
periods to which parent or custodian and tribe are entitled.
This notice and waiting period requirement is somewhat
confusing because two independent rights of intervention are
involved - the right of the parents or Indian custodian, 18 6 and the
right of the tribe. 8 7 In an attempt to clarify any confusion
surrounding the automatic stay of state court proceedings, the
guidelines recommend that the state court take no action until all of
the following dates have passed:
(i) [T]en days after the parent or Indian custodian
(or Secretary where the parent or Indian custodian is
unknown to the petitioner) has received notice;
(ii) ten days after the Indian child's tribe (or the
Secretary if the Indian child's tribe is unknown to the
petitioner) has received notice;
(iii) thirty days after the parent or Indian custodian
has received notice if the parent or Indian custodian has
requested an additional twenty days to prepare for the
proceeding; and
182. See 25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982). Guideline B.5(c) specifies:
The tribe, parents or Indian custodians receiving notice from the petitioner of the
pendency of a child custody proceeding has the right, upon request, to be granted
twenty days (or such additional time as may be permitted under state law) from the
date upon which the notice was received to prepare for the proceeding.
Guideline B.5(c), supra note 35, at 67,588.
183.25 U.S.C. $ 1912(a) (1982).
184. See Guideline B.6, supra note 35, at 67,589.
185. See id.
186. See 25 U.S.C. S 191 1(c) (1982); Guideline B.6 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,589.
187. See 25 U.S.C. S191 1(c) (1982); Guideline B.6 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,589.
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(iv) thirty days after the Indian child's tribe has
received notice if the Indian child's tribe has requested an
8
additional twenty days to prepare for the proceeding. I

Of course, both the time limits contained in the Act and the
Secretary's recommended guidelines are the minimum time
periods required by law. 189 A court may grant more time when
state procedures permit or because of the circumstances of a
particular case. 190 In these circumstances, the notice sent to the
parents or custodian and tribe should advise the recipient that
additional time is available. 191
In addition to the right to intervene in involuntary state
custody proceedings, the Act provides that the Indian child's
parents or custodian have the right to remove the matter to tribal
court. 19 2 Either of the parents, the Indian custodian, or the tribe
may ask the state court, orally or in writing, to transfer the Indian
child custody matter to the tribal court of the child's tribe. 193 If the
request is oral, the guidelines require the state court to reduce it to
writing and make that document a part of the record in the case. 194
Upon receipt of a request to transfer, the state court must
transfer the case unless: (1) a biological parent objects; (2) the tribal
court declines to hear the matter; or (3) the state court determines
that good cause exists for denying the request.195 Since the ICWA
gives either parent an absolute veto over the transfer request, if a
188. Guideline B.6(b), supra note 35, at 67,589.
189. Guideline B.6(c), supra note 35, at 67,589.
190. See Guideline B.6 commentary, supranote 35, at 67,589.
191. Guideline B.5(bXvii), supra note 35, at 67,586.
192. See 25 U.S.C. S 191 l(b) (1982). The ICWA specifically provides that:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of
the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall
transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either
parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's
tribe: Provided, that such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of
such tribe.
Id.
193. Id.; Guideline C.1, supra note 35, at 67,590. Guideline C.1 only deals with transfers in
which the Indian child is not domiciled or residing on an Indian reservation or the ward of a tribal
court. See Guideline C.1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,590. When the child is domiciled or
resides on an Indian reservation, or is otherwise the ward of a tribal court, the tribal court generally
has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. For a discussion of tribal court jurisdiction, see supra notes
129-56 and accompanying text.
194. See Guideline C. 1, supra note 35, at 67,590.
195. See 25 U.S.C. $ 191 1(b) (1982); Guideline C.2(a), supra note 35, at 67,590. Even a nonIndian parent can veto the transfer to tribal court by his or her objection. See In re Baby Boy L., 231
Kan. 199, -, 643 P.2d 168, 178 (1982).
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parent raises an objection no need for an advisary hearing exists;
the state court merely enters an order denying the transfer
request. 96 The same thing is true for the tribal court's right to
decline jurisdiction. Should the tribal court decline jurisdiction, the
state court need not hold a hearing; it can simply enter an order
97
denying the transfer request.1
When a transfer petition is filed, the state court must notify the
tribal court in writing. 19 8 The notice must advise the tribal court of
how long it hasoto make a decision on whether to accept or decline
jurisdiction. 9 9 The tribal court has at least twenty days from
receipt of the notice to accept or decline jurisdiction, 20 0 and its
decision to decline jurisdiction may be made either orally or in
writing. 20 1 If an oral declination of jurisdiction is received, the state
court should reduce the tribal court's nonacceptance of jurisdiction
to writing, and make that document part of the record in the state
court case. 20 2 Absent a parental veto or tribal court declination of
jurisdiction, the state court must transfer the case to tribal court
20 3
unless it finds good cause for not doing so.
When a state court is asked to deny the transfer for good cause,
the court must conduct an adversary proceeding in order to afford
all concerned the opportunity to present their views. 20 4 The party
opposing transfer has the burden of proof on the issue of good
cause.2 0 5 In resolving the question, a state judge may base a finding
of good cause not to transfer on the following:
(i) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when
the petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did
196. Guideline C.2, supra note 35, at 67,591.
197. Set id.
198. Guideline CA(b), supra note 35, at 67,592.

199. See id.
200. See id. During this time period the parties are required to file with the tribal court any
arguments that they wish to make either for or against a tribal declination of transfer. Guideline
.4(c), supra note 35, at 67,592. These arguments may be made orally before the tribal court, or
presented in written pleadings that are served by the submitting party on all other parties to the
action. Id.
201. See Guideline .4(c), supra note 35, at 67,592.
202. Cf Guideline .1, supra note 35, at 67,590 (suggesting that oral transfer requests be
reduced to writing and made part of the record). For a discussion of guideline 0.1, see supra note 192
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the importance of filing matters in the state proceeding,
see supro note 178 and accompanying text.

203. See 25 U.S.C. $ 191 l(b) (1982); Guideline C.2(a), supra note 35, at 67,590. Good cause not
to transfer is actually a modification of the "forum non conveniens doctrine," which Congress intended
state courts to exercise when necessary to insure that the rights of the child, parent or Indian
custodian, and tribe are fully protected. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 21.
204. Guideline 0.2 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,591. The state court must resolve the
transfer question before it can proceed on the merits. See In re M.E.M., 195 Mont. 329,
-, 635
P.2d 1313, 1317 (1981).
205. Guideline 0.3(d), supra note 35, at 67,591.
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not file the petition promptly after receiving notice of the
hearing.
(ii) The Indian child is over twelve years of age and
objects to the transfer.
(iii) The evidence necessary to decide the case could
not be adequately presented in the tribal court without
undue hardship to the parties or the witnesses.
(iv) The parents of a child over five years of age are
not available and the child has had little or ho contact
20 6
with the child's tribe or members of the child's tribe.
While the Act permits intervention at any point in the state
court proceeding, it does not authorize untimely transfer
requests. 20 7 Late intervention is not as disruptive as is a transfer to
tribal court. 20 8 The state judge cannot, however, base his or her
decision not to transfer on socio-economic conditions or the
adequacy of BIA and tribal social services. 20 9 Nor can a state
court's finding of good cause not to transfer be grounded on
perceived inadequacies in the tribal court system. 2 10 Of course, the
absence of a tribal court, as defined by the Act, is good cause for a
211
state judge to deny the transfer.
206. Guideline C.3(b), supra note 35, at 67,591. Undue hardship as good cause for the state
court not to grant the transfer request is the equivalent offorum non conveniens. See In reJ.R.H., 358
N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984).
207. See Guideline C.1, supra note 35, at 67,590 (the request shall be made promptly after
receiving notice of the proceedings); Guideline C. 1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,590. According
to the guidelines:
Although the Act does not explicitly require transfer petitions to be timely, it does
authorize the court to refuse to transfer a case for good cause. When a party who could
have petitioned earlier waits until the case is almot complete to ask that it be
transferred to another court and retried, good cause exists to deny the request.
Id.
208. See Guideline C. 1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,590. The commentary to guideline C. 1
specifies that:

Timeliness is a proven weapon of the courts against disruption caused by
negligence or obstructionist tactics on the part of counsel. Ifa transfer petition must be
honored at any point before judgment, a party could wait to see how the trial is going
in state court and then obtain another trial if it appears the other side will win.
Delaying a transfer request could be used as a tactic to wear down the other side by
requiring the case to be tried twice. The Act was not intended to authorize such tactics
and the "good cause" provision is ample authority for the court to prevent them.
Id.
209. Guideline C.3(c), supranote 35, at 67,591.
210. Id.
211. Guideline C.3(a) and commentary, supra note 35, at 67,591. The Act defines "tribal
court" as follows:

[A] court with jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and which is either a Court
of Indian Offenses, a court established and operated under the code or custom of an
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If the state court transfers the case to tribal court, the
guidelines require the state tribunal to provide the tribal court with
all available information concerning the case. 2 12 Once the matter is
transferred, the applicable procedures and rights of the litigants are
determined by tribal law, not state or federal law. 2 13 Except for a
couple of minor instances, neither the ICWA nor the Secretary of
2 14
Interior's guidelines apply to tribal courts.
If the child custody proceeding is not transferred to a tribal
court, the state court may proceed to terminate parental rights, or
place the Indian child in a foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive
home. 2 15 But in doing so, the state court must comply with the
2 16
other provisions of the Act establishing standards of proof;
providing a preference for placement of the child in an Indian
home; 217 and creating certain parental and custodial rights.21 8
Failure to comply with these additional requirements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act may leave a state court's custody decision
vulnerable to collateral attack 21 9 and provide strong grounds for
Indian tribe, or any other administrative body of a tribe which is vested with authority
over child custody proceedings.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(12) (1986). It is very important to determine whether the tribal court is a Court of
Indian Offenses or a court established and operated under tribal law. Courts of Indian Offenses are
actually federal courts, created by federal law. See 25 C.F.R. S 11.1-11.37 (1986). Because they are
federal courts, the Constitution applies to proceedings before a Court of Indian Offenses. See
Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1965). Tribal courts created under tribal law,
rather than federal law, function beyond constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Trans-Canada Enter.,
Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of'the
application of state and federal constitutional protections to tribal court proceedings, see infra note
213 and accompanying text.
212. Guideline C.4(d), supra note 35, at 67,592.
213. See In re D.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 282 (S.D. 1980) (when tribal court has
jurisdiction, rights of all concerned are those outlined by that court). If the tribal court is a Court of
Indian Offenses, constitutional safeguards apply to proceedings before that court. See supra note 211.
Most tribal courts, however, are organized and created under tribal rather than federal law. North
Dakota reservations, for example, have court systems created under tribal law and custom. Tribal
courts created by tribal law are not subject to constitutional limitations. See Muckleshoot, 634 F.2d at
476-77. The United States Constitution does not apply to proceedings before these tribally formed
courts. See id. (unless they are made expressly binding by the Constitution or otherwise imposed by
Congress, constitutional rights do not apply to the exercise of governmental powers by an Indian
tribe); accord Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 241 (9th Cir. 1974) (prior to Congress' enactment of
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, constitutional rights were not applicable to Indian tribes). The
only federal rights and safeguards available to protect the parties against abuses by tribal authorities
are those contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, SS
201-701, 82 Stat. 77 (current version codified at 25 U.S.C. SS 1302-1326 (1982)). Furthermore, the
rights and protections contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act do not include the complete panoply
of federal constitutional rights normally accorded United States citizens. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n. 14 (1978).
214. The ICWA's full faith and credit provisions apply to tribal governments. See 25 U.S.C. S
191 1(d) (1982). Likewise, the guidelines enlist tribal assistance in determining who is qualified to be
an expert witness. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
215. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982).
216. See infra notes 221-35 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 243-67 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 268-90 and accompanying text.
219. See 25 U.S.C. S 1914 (1982).
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22 0
reversal if the decision is appealed.
C.

STANDARDS OF PROOF

A state court cannot remove an Indian child from his or her
parents or legal custodian unless the court is satisfied that active
efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and
that these efforts have proven unsuccessful. 221 The burden of
demonstrating these remedial efforts, and their failure, lies with the
party that is petitioning the state court for foster care placement of
222
an Indian child or termination of the parents' rights to that child.
This requirement may affect state court jurisdiction. 223 Hence, it
would be wise for a state court to support its decision to remove an

Indian child with specific findirs of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the rehabilitative efforts made to avoid the breakup of
that child's family, and how those efforts have proven
unsuccessful. 224
220. See, e.g., In re M.E.M., 636 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Mont. 1981) (even though mother never
requested appointed counsel to represent her in termination hearing, district court erred in not doing
so); In reJ.L.H., 299 N.W.2d 812, 814 (S.D. 1980) (reversing trial court's termination of Indian
mother's parental rights for failure to use the ICWA's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof).
221. Guideline D.2, supra note 35, at 67,592. It is not clear from the language of S 1912(d)
whether this remedial services provision applies to both voluntary and involuntary proceedings, but
the legislative history suggests that Congress only intended it to apply to involuntary proceedings. See
H.R. REP. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 22. Relying upon this legislative history, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has held that the ICWA only requires family rehabilitative efforts in involuntary
Indian child custody proceedings. See B.R.T. v. Executive Director, 391 N.W.2d 594, 600 (N.D.
1986).
222. See 25 U.S.C. S 1912(d)(1982). The guideline specifies that:
Any party. petitioning a state court for foster care placement or termination of
parental rights to an Indian child must demonstrate to the court that prior to the
commencement of the proceeding active efforts have been made to alleviate the need to
remove the Indian child from his or her parents or Indian custodians. These efforts
shall take into account the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life of
the Indian child's tribe. They shall also involve and use the available resources of the
extended family, the tribe, Indian social service agencies and individual Indian care
givers.
Guideline D.2, supra note 35, at 67,592.
223. Cf 25 U.S.C. S 1912(a) (1982) (delineating other requirements of state courts in Indian
child custody proceedings that may have jurisdictional consequences).
224. The state or petitioning party must prove these rehabilitative efforts by the same standard
of proof as required in the overall proceeding. In re S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885, 887 (S.D. 1982). This
means that in foster care placements the petitioning party must show by clear and convincing
evidence that rehabilitative efforts were made, and that the efforts have failed; beyond a reasonable
doubt is the standard in a termination of parental rights case. See id. Standards of proof are discussed
in more detail commencing infra note 226 and accompanying text. But regardless of which standard
of proof applies, it is a simple matter for attorneys and judges to.comply with S 1912(d).
The petitioning party can, for example, meet this remedical and rehabilitative services
requirement by proving that efforts have been made to enroll the parent in child care, chemical
dependency, or similar social programs, and that the parent has spurned them. See In re P.B., 371
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Once the state court is satisfied with these preliminary
matters, it can remove the child from the parents or Indian
custodian, but only if leaving the child in that home "is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."225 In
the case of foster care placement, the party attempting to remove a
child must establish the likelihood of serious emotional or physical
damage to that child by "clear and convincing evidence." 226 If the
objective of the proceedings is to terminate parental rights, the
standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt." ' 227 In other
words, before the court can terminate the parent's or custodian's
rights, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
continued custody by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to that child.
The standard of proof required for foster care placement and
markedly
termination of parental rights under the ICWA i..
different from that employed under state law. State standards
N.W.2d 366, 372 (S.D. 1985). Section 1912(d) does not require a never ending effort or a futile effort
at rehabilitating the Indian family. The law is satisfied if the state or petitioning party shows that
active efforts have been made to provide familial remedial services, and that they have failed. See
Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 70 Or. App. 10, -_,688 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1984); accord In re
State ex rel.
T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (remedial efforts requirement met by showing
that services were made available, but parent or Indian custodian did not follow through with effort
to help himself). The proof of remedial or rehabilitative efforts must result in specific findings by the
state court that the parent or Indian custodian was provided with assistance, but failed to exhibit any
interest in help, that efforts to rehabilitate the parent or Indian custodian have proven unsuccessful,
that the parent or Indian custodian will not respond to future offers of assistance, and that any
additional remedial efforts would be fruitless. In re S.R., 323 N.W.2d at 887.
225. See25 U.S.C. 5 1912(e), (f) (1982). In selecting an Indian child's foster care or preadoptive
home, the state court must place the child in the least restrictive setting that most approximates a
family, and one in which the child's special needs, if any, can be met. See id. 5 1915(b). The least
restrictive alternative is viewed from the child's, rather than the parents', perspective. See In re P.B.,
371 N.W.2d at 373.
226. 25 U.S.C. S 1912(e) (1982). Guideline D.3(a) concerns the standard of proof required for
foster care placement, and specifies as follows:
a foster care placement of an
The court may not issue an order effecting [sic]
Indian child unless clear and convincing evidence is presented, including the
testimony of one or more qualified expert witnesses, demonstrating that the child's
continued custody with the child's parents or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
Guideline D.3(a), supra note 35, at 67,592.
227. 25 U.S.C. S 1912(f) (1982). Congress selected the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
for termination of parental rights because Congress believed that taking a child from the parents was
a penalty as great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty. See H.R. REP. 95-1386, supra note 65, at
22. The following guideline, which deals with termination of parental rights, mirrors the statutory
language on the matter of proof:
inless the court's order
The court may not order a termination of parental rigl
is supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, includi ,the testimony of one or
more qualified expert witnesses, that continued custody of ie child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.
Guideline D.3(b), supra note 35, at 67,592.
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typically permit removal or termination of parental rights for
reasons other than a likelihood of serious physical and emotional
harm. North Dakota, for example, allows a parent's rights to be
terminated by "clear and convincing evidence" that "the child is
suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or
emotional harm." 228 North Dakota law also allows a child to be
removed from his or her parents or legal custodian and placed in a
foster home when there is clear and convincing proof that the child
is deprived. 229 A child is deprived under North Dakota law when
the child:
Is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional
health, or morals, and the deprivation is not due
primarily to the lack of financial means of the child's
230
parents, guardian, or other custodian....
Removal proceedings under state law also differ from removal
proceedings under the ICWA in the type of evidence a court may
consider. The ICWA does not allow a state court to consider
generic poverty, alcohol abuse, or nonconforming social behavior
as evidence that an Indian child should be removed from his or her
home. 23 ' Emphasis under the guidelines is on whether any
particular condition is likely to cause serious damage to the child,
not that a potentially harmful condition exists. 232 The party seeking
removal must prove a cause and effect relationship between the
poverty or nonconforming social behavior, and the likelihood of
serious physical and emotional damage to the child. 233 A child may
not be removed simply because his or her family does not conform
to some stereotypical notion of what a family should be. 234 Nor will
removal be authorized simply because there exists other parental
235
behavior or familial conditions considered to be "bad."
Another major difference between the nature of proof required
under the ICWA and that required under state law is the need for
expert testimony on the issue of serious physical or emotional
228. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-20-44 (1974).
229. Id. S 27-20-29(3),.-30 (1974 & Supp. 1985).

230. Id. S27-20-02(5)(a) (Supp. 1985).
231. Cf Guideline D.3(c), supra note 35, at 67,593.
232. See Guideline D.3 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,593.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
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damage. 236 The ICWA specifically provides that a state court order
for termination of parental rights, or foster care placement, must be
supported by testimony from qualified expert witnesses. 23 7 The
expert must be qualified to testify "specifically to the issue of
whether continued custody by the parents or Indian custodians is
likely to result in serious physical or emotional damage to the
child." ' 2 38 An expert witness is one who is "qualified by reason of
educational background and prior experience to make judgments
on those questions that are substantially more reliable than
239
judgments that would be made by nonexperts."
The guidelines set out the characteristics of persons likely to be
qualified as an expert witness in an Indian child custody
proceeding. 240 But this list is not exhaustive. For purposes of the
ICWA, anyone who is knowledgeable about tribal culture and
childrearing practices may qualify as an expert witness. 2 4' Indian
tribes and the BIA frequently know of persons who are
236. Compare 25 U.S.C. S 1912(e), (f) (1982) (testimony from expert witness required for both
foster care placement and termination of parental rights) with N.D. CENT. CODE S5§
27-20-29(3), -30,
-44 (1974 & Supp. 1985) (permitting foster care placement and termination of parental rights without
testimony of qualified expert witnesses).
237. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1912(e), (f) (1982). The statute speaks in terms of "expert witnesses," but
only one expert witness is required for custody proceedings under the ICWA. See D.A.W. v. State of
Alaska, 699 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1985); see also Guideline D.4(a), supra note 35, at 67,593
(requiring competent testimony from one or more experts qualified to speak directly to the issue of
whether continued custody by the parents or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious physical or
emotional damage to the child).
238. Guideline D.4(a), supra note 35, at 67,593. Congress meant the phrase "qualified expert
witnesses" to refer to expertise beyond that of the normal social worker. See H.R. REP. 95-1386,
supra note 65, at 22; see also State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 70 Or. App. 10, -,
688 P.2d
1354, 1360 (1980) (social worker did not possess specialized knowledge of social and cultural aspects
of Indian life and therefore was not qualified as an expert witness under the ICWA). Furthermore,
the party presenting the expert has the burden of proving that the witness is an expert. See Guideline
D.4 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,593.
239. Guideline D.4 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,593. The trial court should specifically
find that the witness qualifies as an expert under the ICWA. See In re K.A.B.E. & K.B.E., 325
N.W.2d 840, 844 (S.D. 1982).
240. Guideline D.4(b), supra note 35, at 67,593. According to the guidelines, an expert witness
may be:
(i) A member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by the tribal
community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family organization
and childrearing practices.
(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the delivery of child and
family services to Indians, and extensive knowledge of prevailing social and cultural
standards and childrearing practices within the Indian child's tribe.
(iii) A professional person having substantial education and experience in the
area of his or her specialty.
Id.
241. See Guideline D.4 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,593. The trial judge does have,
however, tremendous discretion in deciding who qualifies as an expert witness in an ICWA
proceeding. See In re T.J.J. & G.LJ., 366 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Compare, e.g.,
In
reJ.L.H. & P.L.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650, 651 (S.D. 1982) (social worker competent expert witness in
ICWA case) with State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 70 Or. App. 10, -,
688 P.2d 1354, 1360
(1984) (social worker declared incompetent to be ICWA expert witness).
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knowledgeable concerning a tribe's customs and culture.
Consequently, the guidelines authorize the state judge or any other
party to the proceedings to request the assistance of the Indian
24 2
child's tribe and the BIA in locating qualified expert witnesses.

D.

PLACEMENT PREFERENCES

If an Indian child has been removed from his or her home, it is
necessary for the state court to find another suitable home for that
child. This process is governed by the ICWA. 241 Whether the
removal was consented to or involuntary, any Indian child
accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement must be placed in
the "least restrictive setting which most approximates a family in
which his [or her] special needs, if any, may be met." ' 244 The
ICWA further provides that, in placing an Indian child into a foster
care situation, state courts must give preference to a placement
with the child's extended family, or an Indian home or
24 5
institution.
In the adoptive placement of an Indian child, a state court is
required to give first preference to members of the child's
extended family, 24 6 -next to other families in the child's tribe, 24 7 and
242. See Guideline D.4(c), supra note 35, at 67,593. In an involuntary proceeding, either the
parties or the state court may request BIA assistance in locating expert witnesses. See 25 C.F.R. S
23.91 (1986). Any requests for assistance should be directed to the appropriate Area Director listed
in supra note 121. Expert testimony, however, is not required in voluntary proceedings. See 25
U.S.C. 5 1913 (1982).
243. See25 U.S.C. 5S 1912, 1915 (1982).
244. Id. 5 1915(b).
245. See id. The ICWA's statutory foster care placement preferences are as follows:
(i) A member of the Indian child's extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian
licensing authority: or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an
Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.
Id.; see also Guideline F.2(b), supra note 35, at 67,594 (mirroring the statutory foster care placement
preferences).
246. 25 U.S.C. S 1915(a) (1982). Guideline F. l(a), which covers adoptive placements, specifies.
that:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under state law preference must be
given (in the order listed below) absent good cause to the contrary, to placement of the
child with:
(i)
A member of the child's extended family;
(ii)
Other members of the Indian child's tribe; or
(iii)
Other Indian families, including families of single parents.
Guideline F. l(a), supra note 35, at 67,594.
247.25 U.S.C. S 1915(a) (1982).

19861

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

527

then to other Indian families. 248 Both the Act and the guidelines
make clear that the child's extended family has the primary role in
helping to rear that child. 24 9 Therefore, state courts should look

first to the child's extended family when it becomes necessary to
remove a child from the custody of his or her parents. 250 Moreover,
unless a parent requests anonymity, the state court or petitioner's
counsel must make an effort to notify the child's extended family
and tribe that their members will be given preference in the
adoption decision.2 51 The guidelines also permit adoption by single
252
parent families.
Absent the existence of good cause to do otherwise, state courts
are required to adhere to the ICWA's preferences in placing Indian
children in foster care or adoptive homes. 253 If the child's tribe has
established its own placement preference by tribal resolution then,
absent good cause, the state court must follow the tribal order of
placement so long as it is the least restrictive setting appropriate to
the child's needs. 254 Placement with non-Indian families and
institutions is not provided for in either the Act or guidelines, but
this does not render the preferences provided for in the Act
constitutionally defective. 255 However, absent a specific finding of
good cause for doing so, a state court's placement of an Indian child
contrary to the Act or tribe's preferences is both unlawful and
256
subject to attack.
A state court may base its finding of good cause for ignoring
the ICWA or tribal placement preferences upon one or more of the
following considerations:
248. Id.
249. See id. (providing that the extended family is first on the list of alternatives for placing
Indian children); Guideline F. 1(a), supra note 35, at 67,594 (same).
250. See Guideline F. 1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,594.
251. See Guideline F. 1(c), supra note 35, at 67,594. A parent's request for anonymity would be
submitted via an "affidavit of confidentiality." See supra note 99 and accompanying text. While the
parent's request for anonymity must be given weight in determining the statutory preference, this
right to confidentiality does not outweigh an Indian child's rights under the ICWA. See H.R. REP.
No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 24.
252. Set Guideline F. 1 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,594. Congress intended child custody
decisions to be made on the present or future custodian's ability "to provide the necessary care,
supervision, and support for the child, rather than on preconceived notions of proper family
composition." Id.
253. See 25 U.S.C. S 1915(a), (b) (1982). The ICWA does not require that an Indian child be
placed with a statutorily preferred person or agency. It only requires that state courts give preference
to placing the child with those persons or agencies in th absence of good cause to the contrary. See In
re Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741, -,
331 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1983). Neither did Congress intend to
establish a federal policy against placing Indian children with non-Indian families. See H.R. REP. 951386, supra note 65, at 23.
254.25 U.S.C. S 1915(c) (1982).
255. See In re Angus, 60 Or. App. 546, , 655 P.2d 208, 213 (1983) (the ICWA does not
provide for placement with non-Indian families and institutions, but the Act survives constitional
equal protection analysis), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
256. Apparently, no collateral attack is permitted for placements in violation of the preference:
of the Indian child's family. See infra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
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(i) The request of the biological parents or the child
when the child is of sufficient age.
(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs
of the child as established by testimony of a qualified
expert witness.
(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for
placement after a diligent search has been completed for
2 57
families meeting the preference criteria.
The burden of proving the existence of good cause not to follow the
established order of preference is upon the party who is urging the
258
court to deviate from the stated placement preference.
Neither the Act nor the guidelines preclude the use of socioeconomic considerations to deviate from the placement
preferences.

259

But a state court should not base its decision to place

an Indian child into a non-Indian foster or adoptive home upon the
mere advantage that may accrue to that child from life in a more
affluent non-Indian home setting. 260 The state court could,
however, consider the foster or adoptive parents' wealth as a factor
in meeting some extraordinary physical or emotional need of the
child, and this may constitute good cause for the nonpreferred
placement.261
Any state court that enters a final decree or order in an Indian
child adoptive placement is required to provide the Secretary of
Interior with a copy of the decree or order and any other
information concerning the proceeding and parties. 26 2 State courts
257. Guideline F.3(a), supra note 35, at 67,594.
258. See Guideline F.3(b), supra note 35, at 67,594; see also In re Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741,
331 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1983) (reversing and remanding because trial court failed to make findings of
good cause to deviate from ICWA placement preferences).
259. See 25 U.S.C. S 1915(1982); Guidelines F.l-F.3, supra note 35, at 67,594.
260. Cf Guideline C.3(c), supra note 35, at 67,591 (general socio-economic conditions do not
constitute "good cause" for the failure to transfer the proceedings to a tribal court).
261. See Guideline F.3 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,594. In some cases a child may need
highly specialized treatment or other services that are not available in the community where a
preferred family lives. In such cases, the Secretary recommends that the needs of the child be
considered good cause to place that child in a nonpreferred home. See id.
262. 25 U.S.C. 5 1951 (1982). The state court must provide the Secretary with the following
specific information, if known:
(1) The name and tribal affiliation of the child;
(2) the names and addresses of the biological parents;
(3) the names and addresses of the adoptive parents; and
(4) the identity of any agency having files or information relating to such
adoptive placement.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of this reporting requirement, see supra notes 93, 97.
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are also required to keep records evidencing the efforts that were
made to comply with the placement preferences specified in the
ICWA. 263 The state must make these records available, at264any
time, upon the request of the Secretary or Indian child's tribe.
The law does not require the state to keep records from
state placement proceedings in, a single location,2 65 but the
guidelines do recommend that the state establish a particular
location where all records of foster care and adoptive placement of
Indian children can be obtained within seven days of their
request. 266 It is the Secretary of Interior's position that the state has
a
complied with the law if the placement records can be retrieved by
267
single state office and promptly made available to the requester.
.E.PARENTAL

RIGHTS

When the state removal proceedings are nonconsensual, the8
26
Indian child's parents or Indian custodians are entitled to notice,
intervention, and the right to petition for transfer of the
proceedings to tribal court. 26 9 As an additional safeguard, the Act
provides that whenever state or other federal law provides for a
or
higher standard of protection of the rights of Indian parents 27
0
law.
protective
more
the
apply
custodians, then the court must
Yet these are not the only procedural safeguards extended to Indian
parents and custodians in involuntary child custody proceedings. If
the parent or custodian cannot afford counsel, he or she is entitled
263. 25 U.S.C. S 1915(e) (1982).
264. See id.
265. See id. (not requiring that records from state placement proceedings be stored in one
location, but providing that the state maintain these records).
266. Guideline G.4, supra note 35, at 67,595. Guideline G.4 addresses the requirement that state
records be maintained, and it recommends that:
The state shall establish a single location where all records of every foster care,
preadoptive placement and adoptive placement of Indian children by courts of that
state will be available within seven days of a request by an Indian child's tribe or the
Secretary. The records shall contain, at a minimum, the petition or complaint, all
substantive orders entered in the proceeding, and the complete record of the
placement determination.
Id.
267. See Guideline G.4 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,595.
268. See supra notes 162-75 and accompanying text.
269. For a discussion of the transfer procedure, see supra notes 192-220 and accompanying text.
270. 25 U.S.C. S 1921 (1982); Guideline A.2, supra note 35, at 67,586; see also In reJ.R.S., 690
P.2d 10, 15-16 (Alaska 1984) (recognizing a right of intervention under state law for the tribe even
though ICWA provided no such right in 'avoluntary adoption proceeding). Because the parents,
Indian custodian, and tribe have the benefit of both state and federal law, in all ICWA governed
proceedings a state court should make findings sufficient to comply with both state and federal law.
See, e.g., In re R.M.M., 316 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn. 1982) (trial court terminated parental rights
with findings sufficient to satisfy both Minnesota state law and the ICWA).
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to a court appointed attorney. 21 The court may likewise appoint
counsel for the child if it finds that such an appointment is in the
272
child's best interest.
When provided for by state law, appointed counsel's fees will
be paid by the state. 2 73 But if state moneys are not available, the
Secretary of the Interior is required to pay reasonable fees and
expenses. 274 The Secretary's obligation to pay attorney's fees,
however, is contingent upon notification by the state court that
counsel has been appointed pursuant to the ICWA, and
certification by the presiding state judge of the nature and amount
275
of those fees.
271. 25 U.S.C. S 1912(b) (1982). If the biological parents or Indian custodian appear in court
without an attorney, the guidelines mandate that:
[Tlhe court shall inform him or her of the right to appointed counsel, the right to
request that the proceeding be transferred to tribal court or to object to such transfer,
the right to request additional time to prepare for the proceeding and the right (if the
parent or Indian custodian is not already a party) to intervene in the proceedings.
Guideline B.5(f), supra note 35, at 67,588. One state court has construed the ICWA to require
appointment of counsel for indigent parents even if they do not request it. See In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d
1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981). But see B. R. T. v. Executive Director, 391 N.W.2d 594, 600 (N.D. 1986)
(indicating that right to counsel not violated when parent is advised of right but fails to request the
appointment). The right to counsel under the ICWA is dependent upon the state court's finding that
the child is an Indian, and that the parent is indigent. See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles, 70
Or. App. 10, -, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (1984). Moreover, right to appointed counsel does not mean
counsel of one's choice, nor the right to reject a court appointed attorney without good cause. See
V.F. v. State of Alaska, 666 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Alaska 1983). The right to appointed counsel is,
however, restricted to involuntary proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 22.
272. 25 U.S.C. S 1912(b) (1982).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. 25 C.F.R. S 23.13 (1986). This notice from the state court should be sent to the Area
Director at the address provided in supra note 121, and it must include the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Name, address and telephone number of attorney who has been appointed.
Name and address of client for whom counsel is appointed.
Relationship of client to child.
Name of Indian child's tribe.
Copy of the petition or complaint.
Certification by the court that state law makes no provision for appointment

of counsel in such proceedings.
(7) Certification by the court that the client is indigent.
Id. S 23.13(a). Within 10 days after receipt of the notice of appointment, the Area Director is
required to give written notice to the state court, client, and attorney concerning whether the client
has been certified as eligible to have his or her attorney fees and expenses paid by the BIA. Id. S
23.13(c). If the certification is denied, the Area Director must include written reasons for denying the
certification. Id. Certification may be denied for the following reasons only:

(1) The litigation does not involve a child custody proceeding as defined in 25
U.S.C. 1903(1);
(2) The child who is the subject of the litigation is not an Indian child as defined

in 25 U.S.C. 1903(4);
(3) The client is neither the Indian child who is the subject of the litigation, the
Indian child's parent as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903(9), or the child's Indian custodian
as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903(6);

(4) State law provides for appointment of counsel in such proceedings;
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If the child's removal or the termination of parental rights is
consensual, the Act likewise includes certain procedures for the
parents' protection. To be effective, the parents' consent must be
"executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of
competent jurisdiction. ' 27 6 The judge must also certify that he
or she fully explained the terms and consequences of the consent to
each consenting parent or Indian custodian, and that they
27 7
understood this explanation.
(5) The notice of the Area Director of appointment of counsel is incomplete; or
(6) No funds are available for such payments.
Id. S23.13(b), (c.
If the Area Director certifies payment of attorney fees, the state court shall:
(1) Determine the amount of payments due appointed counsel by the same
procedures and criteria it uses in determining the fees and expenses to be paid
appointed counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
(2) Submit approved vouchers to the Area Director who certified eligibility for
Bureau payment together with the court's certification that the amount requested is
reasonable under the state standards and considering the work actually performed in
light of the criteria that apply in determining fees and expenses for appointed counsel
in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Id. 5 23.13(d). The Area Director must authorize payment of the attorney fees set out in the state
court approved voucher unless:
(1)The court has abused its discretion under state law in determining the
amount of the fees and expenses; or
(2) The client has not been previously certified as eligible under paragraph (c) of
this section; or
(3) The voucher is submitted later than ninety (90) days after completion of the
legal action involving a client certified as eligible for payment of legal fees under
paragraph (b) of this section.
Id. S 23.13(e). The Area Director then has 15 days after receipt of the voucher within which to
approve or deny payment, and to give the state court, client, and attorney, written notice of the
decision. Id. S 23.13(f). If payment is denied or the amount authorized is less than that requested in
the state court approved voucher, the Area Director must also include in this notice a written
statement of the reasons for the decision. See id.
An appeal is permitted whenever the Area Director refuses to certify appointment of counsel, or
refuses to authorize payment of attorney fees in the amount requested on an approved state court
voucher. See id.S 23.13(c), (1). The Area Director's failure to comply with the deadlines specified for
deciding certification of appointed counsel or payment of fees is treated as a denial for purposes of
appeal. See id S23.13(g).
276. See 25 U.S.C. S 1913 (1982). When confidentiality is requested, parental consent need not
be executed in open court. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 65, at 23. The guidelines also
provide that the term "judge" is not a term of art; hence, it can certainly be construed to include
judicial officials such as magistrates. See Guideline E.I commentary, supra note 35, at 67, 593.
277. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1913(a) (1982). Concerning the form of the parental consent, the guidelines
recommend that:
(a) The consent document shall contain the name and birthdate of the Indian
child, the name of the Indian child's tribe, any identifying number or other indication
of the child's membership in the tribe, if any, and the name and address of the
consenting parent or Indian custodian.
(b) A consent to foster care placement shall contain, in addition to the
information specified in (a), the name and address of the person or entity by or
through whom the placement was arranged, if any, or the name and address of the
prospective foster parents, if known at the time.
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Parental consent given prior to or less than ten days after the
child's birth is invalid as a matter of law. 278 Indian parents and
279
custodians may withdraw their consent to foster care at any time,
and the child must be returned to them. 280 Consent to a
termination of parental rights or to adoption can be withdrawn by
the parent or Indian custodian anytime up until entry of the final
decree of termination or adoption. 28 I The consenting party may
withdraw his or her consent for any reason prior to entry of the final
decree. 2 2 Once withdrawn, the child must be returned to the
parent. 283
After entry of the final decree of adoption or termination of
(c) A consent to termination of parental rights or adoption shall contain, in
addition to the information specified in (a), the name and address of the person or
entity by or through whom any preadoptive or adoptive placement has been or is to be
arranged.
Guideline E.2, supra note 35, at 67,593. It is the Secretary's position that when the parental consent
complies with the foregoing guideline, it contains enough basic information about the placement or
termination to insure that the consent was knowning, and to document what took place. Guideline
E.2 commentary, supra note 35, at 67,594.
278. 25 U.S.C. 5 1913(a) (1982).
279. Seeid. 5 1913(b).
280. See id. The Secretary of the Interior's recommended procedure for withdrawing consent to
foster care placement is as follows:
Where a parent or Indian custodian has consented to a foster care placement
under state law, such consent may be withdrawn at any time by filing, in the court
where consent was executed and filed, an instrument executed by the parent or Indian
custodian. When a parent or Indian custodian withdraws consent to foster care
placement, the child shall as soon as is practicable be returned to that parent or Indian
custodian.
Guideline E.3, supra note 35, at 67,594. The guidelines do not recommend any particular form for
the withdrawal of consent, only that it be filed in the same state court in which the consent document
itselfwas executed. Id.
281. 25 U.S.C. S 1913(c) (1982). The ICWA does not permit parents to withdraw their consent
once the final state court order terminating parental rights is entered. See In reJ.R.S., 690 P.2d 10,
13 (Alaska 1984); B.R.T. v. Executive Director, 391 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 1986). When the child
is domiciled on an Indian reservation, the parents cannot consent to a state court termination of
rights, and any consent they give is void. See Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 130 Ariz. 202,
___, 635 P.2d 187, 191 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
282. See 25 U.S.C. S 1913(c) (1982). The guideline on withdrawal of consent to termination of
parental rights or adoption states that:
A consent to termination of parental rights or adoption may be withdrawn by the
parent at any time prior to entry of a final decree of voluntary termination or adoption by
filing in the court where the consent is filed an instrument executed under oath by the
parent stipulating his or her intention to withdraw such consent. The clerk of the court
where the withdrawal of consent is filed shall promptly notify the party by or through
whom any preadoptive or adoptive placement has been arranged of such filing and
that party shall insure the return of the child to the parent as soon as practicable.
Guideline E.4, supra note 35, at 67,594 (emphasis in original). Having the clerk of court notify the
parties about the withdrawal of parental consent may be necessary, especially when the biological
parents are not told the identity of the adoptive parents. See Guideline E.4 commentary, supra note
35, at 67,594. Involving the court in this process likewise reduces the chance of confrontation over
the return of the Indian child.
283. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1913(c) (1982).
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parental rights, a parent cannot withdraw his or her consent
without a finding that it was induced by fraud or duress.2 8 4
Subsection 1913(d) of the Act allows parents to commence a
collateral suit to vacate any adoption consented to under fraud or
duress,2 85 and if such a suit is successful the court must order the
child returned to the parents.2 8 6 No adoption, however, that has
been effective for at least two years may be attacked by Indian
parents under subsection 1913(d).2 8 7 But when state law permits
the adoption to be vacated by the parents or others beyond this two
year period, then the ICWA authorizes application of the more
2 88
liberal state law.
It must be emphasized that this two year "statute of
limitations" for vacating an adoption applies only to cases in which
parental consent was obtained by fraud or duress.28 9 The ICWA
has a separate procedure for collaterally attacking Indian child
custody orders and decrees entered by state courts in violation of its
290
other provisions.
F.

ENFORCEMENT AND POST TRIAL RIGHTS

Failure of a state court to comply with the provisions of the
Indian Child Welfare Act can form the basis of an appeal and, in
many instances, will mandate reversal of the lower court's final
custody decision. 291 But the Act also provides for other post trial
remedies and rights which are designed to insure that state judges,
social service agencies, and attorneys comply with the law. These
matters should concern everyone involved in a state court Indian
child custody proceeding, for they are the vehicles by which state,
federal, and tribal courts may vacate many existing foster care and
adoptive placements of Indian children.
As previously noted, when the Indian parent's consent to
adoption was obtained by either fraud or duress, the Act permits
that parent to petition a court to vacate the adoption within two
years after its final decree was entered, or within any longer period
284. See id. S 1913(d).
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Id. For a discussion of remedies, see infra notes 291-314 and accompanying text.
288. See 25 U.S.C. SS1913(d), 1921 (1982).
289. See id. 5 1913(d).
290. See infra text accompanying notes 294-314.
291. See, e.g., In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Mont. 1981) (reversing a state trial court
because it failed to appoint counsel for an Indian parent); In reJ.L.H., 299 N.W:2d 812, 814 (S.D.
1980) (trial court reversed when it erroneously terminated parental rights under a state "clear and
convincing evidence" standard instead of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" ICWA standard of
proof).
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of time authorized by state law. 292 Although the Secretary

recommends that the parent file his or her petition to vacate in the
same court in which the decree was entered, the ICWA does not
293
require this.

In addition to the specific remedy provided for vacating
adoptions predicated upon parental consent obtained through
fraud or duress, the Act also allows collateral suits to set aside state
foster care placements or termination of parental rights obtained in
violation of certain provisions of the IC WA. 294 This authorization

295
is contained in section 1914 of the Act.
Section 1914 has been construed to permit collateral suit in
federal

court, 296 a forum traditionally hostile to domestic actions. 297

292. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text. The guidelines suggest that:
Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall give notice to all parties to the
adoptive proceedings and shall proceed to hold a hearing on the petition. Where the
court finds that the parent's consent was obtained through fraud or duress, it must
vacate the decree of adoption and order the consent revoked and order the child
returned to the parent.
Guideline G. l(b), supra note 35, at 67,595.
293. Compare 25 U.S.C. S 1914 (1982) ("parent ...
may petition any court of competent
jurisdiction") with Guideline G.1, supra note 35, at 67,595 (same court in which the decree was
entered is the proper court for the parent's petition). The Secretary recommends filing the petition to
vacate in the same court because that court clearly has jurisdiction, and the witnesses on fraud or
duress are likely to be within itsjurisdiction. See Guideline G. I commentary, supra note 35, at 67,595.
There may be, however, other forums available, including tribal court. This possibility is discussed
infra note 296.
294. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 5 1914 (1982); In re Angus, 60 Or. App. 546, 547, 655 P.2d 208, 209,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1982) (parents of an Indian child successfully brought habeas corpus action
for return of their child from adoptive parents).
295. See 25 U.S.C. 5 1914 (1982). Section 1914, title 25 of the United States Code provides as
follows:
Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care placement or
termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian custodian from
whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child's tribe may petition any
court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such
action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.
Id.
296. See Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 83-2481
(collateral attack on state court judgment allowing non-Indian couple to adopt a child who the
Kiowa Tribe contended was Indian). The Kiowa Tribe case is significant for reasons other than its
implicit recognition of federal court jurisdiction over violations of the ICWA; it defines the
parameters within which a collateral attack can be made in federal court upon a state court decision.
Id. A state court determination that the ICWA does not apply is binding on a federal court unless
the state court determination does not satisfy "the minimum procedural requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id,
A more interesting forum possibility under $ 1914 is tribal court. This section permits the child,
parents, custodian, and tribe to petition "any court of competent jurisdiction" to invalidate certain
improper state court removals. 25 U.S.C. $ 1914 (1982). This "any court" language of the statute
would certainly include a tribal court. Cf Kiowa Tribe, 777 F.2d at 592 (5 1914 was basis of federal
court action to invalidate state removal order). Moreover, if the tribal court had jurisdiction, its
order and decisions in a child custody matter would be entitled to full faith and credit. See 25 U.S.C.
5 191 l(d) (1982). A tribe should have subject matter jurisdiction in 5 1914 cases involving its
members. Cf Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-67, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 911 (1981)
(tribes have civil authority over non-Indian activities which threaten or have some direct effect on the

19861

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

535

This section, however, only applies to violations of sections 1911
(exclusive tribal court jurisdiction), 1912 (involuntary proceedings), and 1913 (voluntary proceedings). 298 It does not
authorize collateral suits to set aside state court placements that
violate section 1915: which relates to foster care and adoption
preferences. 299 Presumably then, any state court foster care or
adoptive placement contrary to the Act's stated preference for
Indian families and homes can only be challenged by a direct
appeal.30 0 This is apparently so because section 1914 does not
specifically include a violation of section 1915 as a subject for
collateral suit. But this omission is of little consequence since the
violations that can be challenged by parents, Indian custodians,
and tribes under section 1914 constitute the bulk of the rights
created by the ICWA.
Under section 1914 a state court's failure to recognize a tribe's
exclusive jurisdiction in Indian custody proceedings, 30 1 its refusal
30 2
to permit the parents, Indian custodian, or tribe to intervene,
and the court's decision not to transfer the proceedings to tribal
court3 0 3 are all reviewable in a collateral suit. If the state court does

not give full faith and credit to tribal law, this too is reviewable by'
another state court, a federal court, or perhaps even a tribal
court. 30 4 Violation of the notice and stay provisions of section 1912

are also proper subject for collateral attack, as are violations of the
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978) (tribes have the broadest of powers over their members). Besides, whether
jurisdiction exists is a proper question for the tribal court to decide, subject only to limited review by
a federal district court. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 105 S. Ct. 2447, 2454
(1985) (whether a tribal court has jurisdiction should first be determined by that court).
297.'See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 2D S 3609 (2d ed. 1984).
298. See 25 U.S.C. S 1914 (1982). For a discussion of a tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction, see
supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. For a discussion of rights involved in involuntary
proceedings, see supra notes 157-91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a consensual
termination proceeding, see supra notes 276-90 and accompanying text.
299. See id.; B.R.T. v. Executive Director, 391 N.W.2d 594, 601 (N.D. 1986) ("invalidation of
a parental rights termination may not be accomplished by showing a violation of the placement
preferences in a proceeding brought pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 5 1914").
300. Appellate courts that have considered placements of Indian children in violation of the
Act's stated preference for Indian families have reached different results. Compare In reJ.R.S., 690
P.2d 10, 14-15 (Alaska 1984) (setting aside adoption for trial court's disregard of ICWA's placement
preferences) with In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199,
-, 643 P.2d 168, 176 (1982)
(holding that the Act's placement preferences did not apply to adoption proceedings involving
illegitimate child of non-Indian mother because that child had never been in any care or custody of
the putative father, nor part of any Indian family relationship).
301. See 25 U.S.C. S 191 l(a) (1982) (tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over a child custody
proceeding when an Indian child resides or is domiciled within the reservation, or the Indian child is
a ward of the tribal court).
302. See id. S 1911 (c).
303. See id. S 1911(b).
304. See id. S 1911(d), 1914. Review by tribal court is also a possibility. For a discussion of
tribal courts as remedial forums, see supra note 296.
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30 6 preremoval efforts to
right to counsel, 305 access to records,
30 7 and standards of proof governing
rehabilitate the Indian family,
3 0 8 Finally,
any alleged
Indian child custody proceedings.
of
termination
voluntary
for
noncompliance with the procedures
by
reviewed
be
parental rights contained in section 1913 can
order for
another court and, if proven, will justify setting aside the
30 9
rights.
parental
of
termination
or
placement
care
foster
No specific federal statute of limitations is provided for suits
brought pursuant to section 1914.310 It is thus possible that in many
instances a parent's collateral attack upon the state decree would be
1
barred by a state statute of limitations.3 1 However, with respect to
decrees entered in violation of two particular provisions of the
ICWA, there may be no time limit on the bringing of a suit. In
those child custody proceedings in which the tribal court had the
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to subsection 1911(a), any state
court orders or decrees would be void ab initio.312 Similarily, since
parental consent obtained in violation of the ICWA is invalid as a

matter of law, 3 13 any subsequent state court order for foster care or

adoptive placement predicated on that defective consent should
likewise be void. It would seem, therefore, that if these particular
violations of the Act render the state court orders or decrees void,
such void orders and decrees could be vacated by another court at
314
any time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Provisions
being followed
Hopefully, this
and counsel's

of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 are not
in many state Indian child custody proceedings.
disregard for the law is premised upon the court
ignorance, rather than intentional disrespect.

305. See id. S 1912(b).
306. See id. 51912(c).
307. Seeid. S 1912(d).
308. Seeid. S 1912(e), ().
309. See id. S 1914. For a discussion of the limitations on the collateral attacks permitted under
the ICWA, see supra text accompanying note 296.
310. Saeid.
311. Federal statutory remedies frequently borrow an applicable
state statute of limitations. See,
e.g., Fomby v. City of Calera, 575 F. Supp. 221, 223 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (state statute of limitations
applied to an action brought under § 1983 of title 42); Miller v. City of Overland Park, 231 Kan.
-_, 646 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1982) (same).
557,
312. See 25 U.S.C. S 191 1(a) (1982).
313. See id. S 1913(d).
-, 462 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1984) (a
314. See Cooper v. United Dev. Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 850,
void judgment may be attacked and vacated anytime); Adoption of Baby Child, 102 N.M. -,
-, 700 P.2d 198, 200 (1985) (setting aside state court order in child custody proceeding for a lack
ofjurisdiction because reservation domicile of child precluded mother from consenting to state court
adoption).
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But regardless of the reason or reasons for disregard of this law by
state judges, social workers, and attorneys, the ICWA has
widespread application to custody proceedings in North Dakota
and other western states.
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted by Congress to
preserve the Indian family and to protect tribal existence. Yet this
law is not so inflexible that it attempts to attain these goals at the
expense of the Indian child. Neither is it difficult for judges and
attorneys to comply with the Act. If the court and counsel recognize
and apply the ICWA, they can, with the proper showing and
findings, arrive at a valid, enforceable decision that serves the best
interest of the Indian child. Conversely, ignoring this law will most
likely render the final state court decision in an Indian child
custody proceeding vulnerable to attack, and expose social workers
and attorneys to potential civil liability.

